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SECTION 4(f) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION ACT
OSCAR S. GRAY*
The enactment in 1966 of section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Act' represented the first major legislative
victory, apart from water resource development programs,2 in the
battle of conservationists for control of public works projects. That
section provides for the protection of parks, recreation areas, wildlife
and waterfowl refuges and historic sites (referred to below as "protected
lands"), as well as for the preservation of the natural beauty of the
countryside. Section 4(f) has become increasingly important as a
basis for judicial review of administrative decisions in all areas under
the jurisdiction of DOT.
Although the courts have begun to provide illumination, a number
of key questions remain unanswered as to the meaning of the section
and the proper role of the judiciary in reviewing its administration.
This article will attempt to articulate some of those questions and to
suggest some answers.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A.,
1948, J.D., 1951, Yale University.
1. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
2. In the case of certain water resource development programs, the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66c (1970) has required since 1958
that the agency responsible for the project consult with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service. Id. § 662(a). It provides for recommendations by the Secretary
of the Interior regarding measures to mitigate or compensate for damages to wild-
life attributable to such projects [Id. § 662(b)] ; such measures are to be financed
as part of the cost of the projects. Id. § 662(d). With certain exceptions that Act
applies:
[wihenever the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed or
authorized to be impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream or
other body of water otherwise controlled or modified for any purpose whatever,
including navigation and drainage, by any department or agency of the United
States, or by any public or private agency under Federal permit or license . . ..
Id. § 662(a).
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I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Background of the DOT Act
The Department of Transportation was established in 1967 pur-
suant to legislation enacted in 1966' which brought a number of
separate programs together into a new cabinet-level agency. The
purpose of the consolidation was to include in the new department
operating and promotional functions in connection with all the trans-
portation modes. The independent administrative agencies, however,
were to retain their respective economic regulatory functions relating
to those modes. For instance, the formerly independent Federal Avia-
tion Agency was to become DOT's Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)," with the functions of promoting civil aviation5 and providing
for aviation safety" and the efficient use of the navigable airspace,7
whereas the economic regulation of air carriers was to be left with the
independent Civil Aviation Board." Similarly the responsibility for
development9 and for safety regulation of railroads10 was to be assigned
to a new Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in DOT," and the
safety regulation of motor carriers to a Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety
in DOT's new Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)," while
3. Department of Transportation Act of Oct. 25, 1966, Publ. L. No. 89-670,
80 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 3, 5, 10, 15, 18, 23, 29, 33, 40, 42, 49,
50 U.S.C.). The organization of a Department of Transportation is said to have
been initially proposed as early as 1804, by Albert Gallatin, Thomas Jefferson's Sec-
retary of the Treasury. Remarks by John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation,
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Mar. 17, 1970.
4. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1652(e) (1), 1655(c) (1970).
5. 49 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
6. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-30 (1970). Certain safety functions, primarily related
to the investigation of accidents, were to be carried out in DOT by the newly created
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). 49 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970).
8. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371-87 (1970).
9. The Federal Railroad Administration carries out the Secretary's general
responsibilities to "exercise leadership ... in transportation matters" and to "pro-
mote and undertake research and development . . . relating to transportation." 49
U.S.C. § 1653(a) (1970).
10. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1655(e), 1655(f)(3) (1970). These functions are subject to
the responsibilities of the NTSB [see note 6 supra], and also include responsibility
for regulating the safety of certain interstate pipelines. Pipelines which transport
water or natural or artificial gas are excepted from this authority. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1(1) (b) (1970). The Secretary of Transportation was later given authority to
regulate the safety of interstate gas pipelines by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act of 1968, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1671-84 (1970). The Secretary delegated this authority
not to FRA, but to the Assistant Secretary for Safety and Consumer Affairs. 49
C.F.R. § 1.58(d) (1972). "Gas" under this act is defined to include "natural gas,
flammable gas, or gas which is toxic or corrosive." 49 U.S.C. § 1671(2) (1970).
11. 49 U.S.C. § 1652(e)(1) (1970).
12. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1655(e), 1655(f) (3) (B) (1970).
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the economic regulation of rail and motor carriers was left with the
Interstate Commerce Commission.'" Other organizations transferred
to DOT included the Coast Guard, from Treasury;14 the Bureau of
Public Roads (BPR), from Commerce to the new FHWA;15 and the
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.' Later, the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration was also transferred to DOT
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development.' 7 These
programs amount to a total roster of about 98,000 employees, and a
total annual budget in the order of $8 billion.la
Before their transfer to DOT each of these organizational entities
had operated under the authority of separate laws which had been
enacted to govern their respective programs. After enactment of the
13. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(f) (1970). There was one anomaly. In the field of mer-
chant shipping, promotional activities are carried out by the Maritime Administration,
within the Department of Commerce, and economic regulation by the independent
Federal Maritime Commission. See Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961 (pts. 1-2), 26
Fed. Reg. 7315 (1961), 46 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970); Reorganization Plan No. 21 of
1950 (pt. 2), 15 Fed. Reg. 3178 (1950), 46 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970). If the legislative
pattern established for other modes of transportation had been followed in this area,
the Maritime Administration would have been transferred from Commerce to DOT.
This had been proposed in the original bill, but was deleted by the House of Repre-
sentatives, which insisted on its version in conference. See CONFERENCE REPORT TO
ACCOMPANY H.R. 15963, H.R. Doc. No. 2236, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); 112
CONG. REc. 25506 (1966) (remarks of Senator Jackson). Maritime safety func-
tions were not involved in this dispute since they are administered by the Coast
Guard [46 U.S.C. §§ 22-39, 361-436 (1970)]. See note 17 infra.
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1655(b) (1970). Various functions of the Secretary of the
Army, relating generally to the regulation of obstructions to navigable waters, such
as bridges and causeways, were also transferred to DOT [49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)
(1970)], and are administered by the Coast Guard in accordance with 49 C.F.R.
§ 1.46(c) (1972).
15. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1652(e)(1), 1655(a) (1970). As a result of a reorgani-
zation of FHWA, BPR has since lost its separate identity. FHWA Notice, Fed-
eral Highway Administration Reorganization (Aug. 6, 1970).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 981 (1970).
17. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 6965 (1968), 49 U.S.C.
§ 1608 (1970).
17a. The largest in terms of personnel are Coast Guard - nearly 45,000,
mostly military - and FAA - over 50,000, mostly air traffic controllers. THE
BuDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1973 - APPENDIX 681-741, 1032-34
(1972). The big money is in the highway program - about $5.5 billion annually.
For fiscal year 1971 there was authorized $5.493 billion to be administered by FHWA,
of which $5.425 billion was for the federal-aid highway program [see note 19 infra],
and $68 million was for other highway programs administered by FHWA, con-
sisting of certain defense highways, forest highways and other roads on public lands.
In addition, about $241 million was authorized for federal highway activities to be
administered by other agencies the same year, such as national park roads and park-
ways ($41 million), forest development roads and trails ($170 million), and Indian
reservation roads ($30 million). U. S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL
HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND MATERIAL RELATING
TO THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION pt. II, at 90-91 (1970).
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DOT Act the earlier authorizing legislation relating to each of these
programs remained in force for the most part, and each separate
program remained under the jurisdiction of the congressional com-
mittee which had traditionally exercised jurisdiction in that area.
For instance, FHWA's federal-aid highway program is governed by
Title 23 of the United States Code, and is part of the substantive
responsibility of the House and Senate Public Works Committees.
The FAA operates under a number of laws, codified for the most part
in Title 49, and is generally under the jurisdiction of the House and
Senate Commerce Committees. The Coast Guard falls mostly under
the Commerce Committee in the Senate, but under the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the House.
Because, however, the proposed Department of Transportation
Act dealt with an organizational matter, the establishment of a new
agency, this bill was handled in the Congress by the Government
Operations Committees of the House and Senate. Some members of
these committees were relatively new to the specific programs concerned
and may have brought with them a degree of independence from some
of the established traditions of the operating programs which were to
be amalgamated into DOT.'
Among the most deeply-rooted of these traditions was the philoso-
phy behind the federal-aid highway program. An old program, 9 it
18. A prominent member was Senator Henry M. Jackson, who had become
deeply involved in conservation issues while serving as Chairman of the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs. He was the member of the Committee credited
with the sponsorship of section 4(f). See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
19. The program was established by the Federal Highway Act of July 11, 1916,
ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355. As amended the program now covers four federal-aid highway
systems provided for in 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). These four systems comprise the
primary, secondary, urban and interstate systems.
The federal aid "primary system" consists of "an adequate system of con-
nected main highways;" it is selected "by each State through its State Highway
department, subject to the approval of the Secretary .... " 23 U.S.C. § 103(b)
(1970).
The federal-aid "secondary system" is selected "by the State Highway de-
partments and the appropriate local road officials in cooperation with each other,
subject to approval by the Secretary . . . ." It includes "farm-to-market roads,
rural mail routes, public school bus routes, local rural roads, country roads, township
roads, and roads of the country road class . . ." provided they are not on another
federal-aid system. Federal-aid secondary roads may be located in urban areas, as
defined below if, they pass through the urban area or connect with another federal-
aid system in the urban area. Id. § 103(c). The term "urban area" means "an area
including an adjacent to a municipality or other urban place having a population
of five thousand or more." Id. § 101.
The federal-aid "urban system", newly authorized at the end of 1970, is to
be established "in each urbanized area", defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101 (a) (1970) as
"an area so designated by the Bureau of Census." These routes are to be selected
"by the appropriate local officials and the State highway departments in cooperation
[VOL. XXXII
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was widely understood by its practitioners to represent a federal-state
"partnership," with emphasis on the prerogatives of the states, which
in practice meant the state highway departments. Although a large
part of the project costs have come from the Federal Highway Trust
Fund (ninety percent in the case of the Interstate highway program,
fifty percent in the case of most other federal-aid highways2"), typically
these federal contributions were not considered by those veteran Bureau
of Public Roads engineers to justify federal interference in decisions
such as highway location and, to a considerable degree, detailed design.
This view, which reflected the historic outlook of the congressional
committees responsible for the program, was based on the notion that
federal contributions were really "state" money. Since the apportion-
ment of funds among the states was predetermined in accordance with
formulas or other plans approved by Congress, it was reasoned that
each state was legally "entitled" to the sums so apportioned. Therefore
use of the funds was considered to be within the sole discretion of the
state, and the authority of the federal administering agency was thought
not to include any discretion as to whether or not funds should be
made available. 2 1
with each other subject to the approval of the Secretary ... " Each such route
must connect with another route on a federal-aid system, but no urban-system route
may also be a route on another federal-aid system. The routes are to be "located
as to serve the major centers of activity, and designed taking into consideration the
highest traffic volume corridors, and the longest trips within such area ..... Id.
§ 103(c).
The "Interstate system," otherwise known as the "National System of Inter-
state and Defense Highways" [Id. § 101 (a)], is to comprise 42,500 miles (plus 200
miles available for certain adjustments) "so located as to connect by routes, as
direct as practicable, the principal metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers, to
serve the national defense and, . . . may be located in both rural and urban areas."
It is scheduled for completion in 1976. Id. § 103(e).
For fiscal year 1972 $560 million has been authorized for the primary system,
exclusive of its extensions into urban areas; between 1917 and 1971 over $11,336
million had been authorized for this program. For 1972 $380 million was authorized
for the secondary system exclusive of urban extension; earlier between 1938 and
1971 $6,080 million had been authorized. $375 million was authorized for 1972 for ex-
tensions of the primary and secondary program in urban areas and related traffic oper-
ation projects; over $5,287 million had been authorized between 1946 and 1971. $100
million was authorized for 1972 for the new federal-aid urban system. The Interstate
system was authorized $4 billion for 1972, in addition to $40.5 billion previously au-
thorized since 1954. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL HIGHWAY AD-
MINISTRATION, FEDERAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND MATERIAL RELATING TO THE
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION pt. II, at 90-91 (1970).
20. Beginning after June 30, 1973 the federal share of federal-aid primary,
secondary and urban system projects will go up to 707. 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1970).
21. The question of discretion to withhold highway funds is reflected in a con-
tinuing dispute between the executive branch and Congress on the issue of executive
impoundment of highway funds for purposes of economy. In 1967, for instance, At-
torney General Ramsey Clark ruled that available funds need not be fully expended
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B. Environmental Developments in the 1966
Transportation Legislation
Against this background a revolt was brewing in the 90th Con-
gress, stimulated largely by the destructive impact of freeways in urban
by the Executive, even after "apportionment" to the states, and that the states do not
have "any inchoate right to the apportioned funds." 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. at 7 (Feb.
25, 1967). In 1968, however, Congress enacted 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (Supp. IV, 1969),
which expressed
... the sense of Congress that under existing law no part of any sums authorized
to be appropriated for expenditure upon any Federal-aid system which has been
apportioned pursuant to the provisions of this title shall be impounded or with-
held from obligation ....
The 1968 provision purported to prohibit such impoundment or withholding "by any
officer or employee of any department, agency or instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Federal Government .... ." In 1970 this was changed to ". . . any
officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government," presumably
to cover more clearly officials in the Executive Office of the President, 23 U.S.C.
§ 101(c) (1970). Executive impoundment for purposes of federal budgetary control
nevertheless continued, amounting to about $1.8 billion by mid-1972. SENATE COMM.
ON PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1972, S. REP. No.
92-1081, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 8 (1972). At least one federal district court has
held that the Secretary of Transportation may not withhold authority to obligate
federal-aid highway apportionments for reasons related to the control of inflation,
on the ground that these reasons "are foreign to the standards and purposes of the
Act." State Highway Comm. of Missouri v. Volpe, 347 F. Supp. 950, 954 (W.D.
Mo. 1972), aff'd - F.2d - (8th Cir., April 2, 1973).
The federal-aid highway program is funded through unusual mechanisms.
Ordinarily the amount which the executive branch may spend (for most purposes
other than the highway program) is determined by congressional appropriations.
The authority of Congress to enact these appropriation acts is limited by the rule
that appropriations must be "authorized." See RULES OF THE HOUSE, CANNON'S
PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE OF RPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 610, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. Rule XXI, § 2, at 441 (1963). The practice dates from 1837. 4 HINDS' PRE-
CEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 383 (1907). This typically means that
there must have been a prior "authorizing" act which either imposes a ceiling on the
amount which may be appropriated in the appropriations act, or which authorizes
the appropriation of such sums as may be necessary for a certain purpose. The
executive branch usually has no authority to incur "obligations" until the appropri-
ation is passed, and normally the appropriation may be less than the authorization,
although it may not exceed it. The ultimate authority as to what may be obligated
is, typically, therefore the appropriations act, which is subject to limitations imposed
by the authorizing legislation. In the normal case the authorizing legislation is
handled in Congress by the committees having substantive jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter, and the appropriation is handled by the House and Senate Committees
on Appropriations.
In the highway program a different concept is used. The Highway Trust Fund
[note 195 infra] is ". . . in effect, a device designed to identify an amount equivalent
to certain designated taxes as a ceiling on the sums available for highway construc-
tion." 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. at 9 (Feb. 25, 1967). The biennial Federal-Aid Highway
Acts authorize appropriations for the federal-aid highway programs in designated
amounts within the limits corresponding to the Highway Trust Fund. The Secretary
of Transportation then "apportions" the amounts authorized to be appropriated on or
before the first of January preceding the fiscal year for which they are authorized
[VOL. XXXII
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areas.22 In order to save Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, 23 Senator
Ralph Yarborough of Texas had introduced a parkland preservation
to be appropriated. 23 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)-(b) (1970). The amount apportioned to
each state usually depends on a statutory formula. Id. § 104 (b). For instance, for
the federal-aid primary system, the formula is: "One-third in the ratio which the
area of each State bears to the total area of all the States; one-third in the ratio
which the population of each State bears to the total population of all the States...;
one-third in the ratio which the mileage of rural delivery routes and star routes in
each State bears to the total mileage of . . . [such] routes in all the States . .. ."
Id. The apportioned funds, that is, those authorized to be appropriated, may be obli-
gated and they remain available for obligation until the end of the second fiscal
year after the fiscal year for which they are authorized. Id. §§ 118(a)-(b).
After apportionment, state highway departments submit general "programs
of proposed projects" for federal approval. Id. § 105(a). A "project" is "an under-
taking to construct a particular portion of a highway, or . . . the particular portion
of highway so constructed." Id. § 101(a). After the programs are approved, the
highway departments submit for approval "surveys, plans, specifications, and esti-
mates for each proposed project" Id. § 106(a). It is this federal approval which is
"deemed a contractual obligation of the Federal Government for the payment of its
proportional contribution thereto." Id. Finally, after the obligations are authorized
as outlined above, and typically after they are already incurred, funds are appropriated
. . based on estimates of the requests to be made by the States in each fiscal year
for reimbursement for work performed . . . . [T]here is a variable, often con-
siderable, time lag between the approval of a project and the requests of the
State for partial or full reimbursement of the Federal proportional contribution
to the cost of the work performed on that project. Thus actual appropriations
in any given year will include reimbursement of costs resulting from projects
approved in preceding years.
42 OP. ATr'Y GEN. at 3 (Feb. 25, 1967).
It is evident that in this scheme the power normallly exercised by the Ap-
propriations Committees is in fact held by the House and Senate Public Works
Committees.
A similar financing scheme, providing obligational authority based on the
amount authorized to be appropriated, rather than the amount appropriated, was
adopted in section 205 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 977.
22. These urban freeway problems are closely related to the use of the private
automobile for peak hour commuting between suburbs and central cities and have
been widely recognized within the transportation community as well as among critics.
For instance, former Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe has stated that
23. The Brackenridge - Olmos Basin Parklands are unique park and recrea-
tion areas situated at the headwaters of the San Antonio River and surrounded
by a densely populated urban area in San Antonio, Texas. The Parklands contain
Sunken Gardens, an open air theatre, two golf courses, the San Antonio Zoo,
picnic areas, nature trails, and many acres of green open space .... [Ilt appears
that the expressway will require the use of between 116 and 250 acres of parkland.
Named Ind. Mem. of San Antonio Con. Soc. v. Texas Hy. Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1020
(5th Cir. 1971). The proposed road, designed to link the San Antonio International
Airport with downtown San Antonio, was initially proposed by the Texas Highway
Department in the mid-1950's. That department approved the route through the
parks in 1963 and persisted in attempting to build it despite the enactment of 23
U.S.C. § 138 (1970) and of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act
[49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970)]. Litigation ensued, described in note 149 infra and
accompanying text.
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amendment to the proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966.24 That
bill had been proceeding through normal legislative channels under the
• . . the way we live in America today would be impossible without economi-
cally healthy and efficient highway transportation . . . . Yet at the same time
we must recognize that highways can wipe out neighborhoods. Air pollution is a
killer. Traffic congestion is tedious - in fact, unhealthy . . . . Highways can
obliterate irreplaceable historical assets. Highways can - and have, in a few
sorry cases - been bulldozed through scenic areas.
Remarks by John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, 13th Biennial Highway
Transportation Congress, Washington, D.C., April 21, 1970.
In an earlier address he had stated:
Our highways have brought great progress, both economic, industrial and by
way of safety . . . . [W]e know that for every five miles of interstate system
that we build we save one human life - not just for that year but for every
succeeding year. . . . Yet . . . public transit is a vital necessity. Our cities . . .
cannot depend on the automobile alone. The private automobile has tremendous
shortcomings in urban areas ....
Never mind the fact that an automobile is some 20 feet long, weighs 2 tons,
and carries, on the average, 1.6 people on each trip. Never mind the fact that
the internal combustion engine (depending on whether you listen to its fans or
its critics) generates from 50 to 80 percent of all the air pollution we breathe
every day. Never mind the fact that the automobile kills 55,000 people every
year, over 150 every day.
Never mind the fact that the leading cause of death among our young people,
aged 16 to 25, is the highway crash. Never mind the fact that in America today
we have one linear mile of highway for every square mile of land, and with the
automobile population growing by 10,000 vehicles every 24 hours the demand for
additional pavement is enormous.
Over and above all these items, we must accept the fact that there are those
in our economy for whom the automobile is far too expensive a purchase.
We must accept the fact that all our proposed social remedies such as model
cities projects, health centers, evening college classes, job training centers,
suburban employment opportunities, and you name-it, just aren't going to get
full utilization if we make automobile ownership an unwritten prerequisite for
participation.
Remarks by John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, Annual Meeting of the
Worcester Chamber of Commerce, Worcester, Mass., Jan. 27, 1970.
24. As introduced the amendment would have provided:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the provi-
sions of this title maximum effort should be made to preserve Federal, State,
and local government parklands and historic sites and the beauty and historic
value of such lands and sites. The Secretary shall cooperate with the States in
developing highway plans and programs which carry out such policy. After
July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve under section 105 of this title any
program for a project which requires the use for such project of any land from
a Federal, State, or local government park or historic site unless (1) there is
no feasible alternative to the use of such land, (2) such program includes all
possible planning to minimize any harm to such park or site resulting from such
use, and (3) where possible and appropriate substitute land will be provided
for such park or site. Any additional project costs incurred for the purpose of
acquiring any such substitute lands shall be considered to be included in "costs
of rights-of-way" for the purpose of this title.
112 CONG. REc. 14074 (1966).
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sponsorship of the Public Works Committees at the same time that
the Department of Transportation Act was being considered by the
Government Operations Committees. The Senate Public Works Com-
mittee accepted, 25 and the Senate passed, 6 most of the Yarborough
amendment, but it was watered down in one important respect in
conference.27
As enacted, the Yarborough amendment, codified as 23 U.S.C.
§ 138, contained three related provisions. First, it "declared .. . the
national policy" that the Secretary (then of Commerce, later of Trans-
portation) should use "maximum effort to preserve . . .government
parklands and historic sites . . . ." Second, it required him to "co-
operate with the States in developing highway plans and programs
which carry out such policy." Finally, it provided that the "Secretary
shall not approve any . . . [highway] program . . .which requires
the use of any land from a Federal, State or local park or historic site,
unless such program includes all possible planning, including con-
sideration of alternatives to the use of such land, to minimize any harm
to such park or site resulting from such use."2
For the first time there was an apparent mandate for the federal
administrators of the highway program to reject a state program in-
volving a park or historic site, for lack of "all possible planning ...
to minimize harm." One notable change from the Senate bill related
to the treatment of "alternatives" to the use of such lands. The original
Yarborough amendment would have prohibited the use of such lands
in case of the existence of an alternative to such use. As enacted, the
question of alternatives was converted to a requirement that the "all
possible planning" must have included "consideration" of alternatives
by the state highway department. The Conference Report made it clear
25. SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKs, REPORT ON FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT
OF 1966, S. REP. No. 1410, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1966).
26. As passed by the Senate the section provided:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the provisions
of this title, the Secretary shall use maximum effort to preserve Federal, State,
and local government parklands and historic sites and the beauty and historic
value of such lands and sites. The Secretary shall cooperate with the States
in developing highway plans and program [sic] which carry out such policy.
After July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve under section 105 of this
title any program for a project which requires the use for such project of any
land from a Federal, State, or local government park or historic site unless
(1) there is no feasible alternative to the use of such land, (2) such program
includes all possible planning to minimize any harm to such park or site result-
ing from such use.
112 CONG. REC. 17448 (1966).
27. CONFERENCE REPORT ON FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1966, H. REP. No.
1903, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
28. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V, 1969) (emphasis added).
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that the change was intentional. 9 Senator Yarborough, nevertheless,
was grateful for whatever remained. 30
Meanwhile the Senate Government Operations Committee included
in the new Department of Transportation bill a provision based on the
Yarborough amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway bill, as it had
been passed by the Senate before dilution in the Conference Committee.
The version provided for the DOT bill was further broadened to in-
clude additional categories of protected land." These provisions ulti-
mately led to sections 2(b) (2) 32 and 4(f)83 of the 1966 DOT Act.
Section 2(b) (2) "declared . . . the national policy that special effort
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and
public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and
historic sites." Section 4(f), the strongest of the 1966 transportation
legislation provisions, provided:
The Secretary shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries
of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture,
and with the States in developing transportation plans and pro-
grams that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural
beauty of the lands traversed. After the effective date of this Act,
the Secretary shall not approve any program or project which re-
quires the use of any land from a public park, recreation area, wild-
life and waterfowl refuge, or historic site unless (1) there is no
feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2)
such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or
historic site resulting from such use.84
Section 4(f) of the DOT Act survived the Senate-House con-
ference without being watered down in the same manner as was the
29. ". . . [T]he requirement that there be no feasible alternative to the use of
the land for highway purposes has been deleted and there has been added the re-
quirement that the planning must include consideration of alternatives to the use of
this land for highway purposes." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 11-12.
30. 112 CONG. REC 21191-92 (1966).
31. These provisions were introduced in S. 3010, 112 CONG. REC. 24202 (1966),
and were discussed in the accompanying SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
REPORT ON ESTABLISHING A DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. No. 1659,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966). According to Senator Magnuson of Washington,
Senator Jackson sponsored these provisions in committee. 112 CONG. REc. 26565
(1966).
32. Department of Transportation Act § 2(b)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1651(b)(2)
(1970).
33. Department of Transportation Act § 4(f), Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat
934 (1966), as amended 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
34. Id. The words "and prudent" were added by the Senate-House Conference
Committee. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 27, at 25.
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Yarborough amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act.35 This was
apparently due to the difference in committee personnel; the conferees
on the DOT Act represented the Government Operations Committees
of the two houses, rather than the Public Works Committees. In part
it was the result of an interesting legislative compromise. The Senate
35. During the House debate on the Conference Report an effort was made by
two congressmen who were not members of the Conference Committee (nor, indeed,
of the House Committee on Government Operations. which was responsible for the bill)
to construe section 4(f) in terms not otherwise provided in its text or legislative
history. Congressman Kluczynski, a member of the Public Works Committee, stated:
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to see section 4(f) appear in this bill . . . but I
would like to sound a word of caution in interpreting section 4(f). There is no
question in my mind that the protection of our parks, open spaces, historic sites
fish and game habitats, and the other natural resources with which our Nation
is so richly endowed, is of the utmost importance and urgency, but not to the
total exclusion of other considerations. To do so would result in as many in-
equities as justifying transportation plans merely on the basis of economy or
efficiency. Other considerations would include the integrity of neighborhoods,
the displacement of people and businesses, and the protection of schools, and
churches and the myriad of other social and human values we find in our com-
munities. Attempting to define "feasible alternative" in light of all of these con-
siderations is virtually impossible and may result in hampering and otherwise
unnecessarily delaying transportation progress. The problem was resolved in
the 1966 Highway Act by rephrasing the requirement to read, "unless such
program includes all possible planning, including consideration of alternatives." I
am glad to see the words "and prudent" added to this section by the conference
committee. With this inclusion, and with "prudent" as the operable word, this
section now becomes workable and effective and I fully support and intend to
vote for the bill as written.
112 CONG. REc. 26651 (1966).
Congressman Rostenkowski, a member of the Banking and Currency Committee,
made the following contribution on section 4(f) :
This is a good amendment . . . . However, I would like to recall for my
colleagues the concern that was voiced when the Highway Act was pending.
Fear was expressed that the amendment might be misinterpreted to mean the
preservation of natural and man-made resources would be the overriding con-
sideration in highway construction. It was made clear at the time that as desir-
able as parkland preservation might be, other important factors must be
considered ....
I will support section 4(f) on the basis that it is the clear intent of the
Congress to establish only guidelines for the approval by the Secretary ....
I heartily endorse the guidelines. I also want the RECORD to show, how-
ever, that it is not the intent of the Congress to tie the Secretary's hands . ...
I can easily foresee circumstances when it may be vital to use such land.
For instance, if it became necessary to choose between preserving a wild-
life refuge or saving human lives by a highway improvement. I do not think
any of us would have any doubt as to which choice should be made. Or, if there
were a choice between using public parkland or displacing hundreds of fami-
lies, with the attendant burden imposed on them, I would want the Secretary to
weigh his decision carefully, and not feel he was forced by the provision of the
bill to disrupt the lives of hundreds of human beings . ...
112 CONG. REc. 26651-52 (1966).
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bill would have transferred the Maritime Administration to DOT.
The House bill did not provide for this transfer. The House was
adamant on the Maritime Administration, and the Senate conferees,
forced to yield on this point,"6 may have been thereby aided in preserving
the Senate version on other differences in the bills.
C. The 1968 Legislation
It rapidly became apparent that there might be a number of
urban highway controversies in which Section 4(f) of the 1966 DOT
Act could be invoked in administrative appeals to Washington, and
possibly also in litigation. Particularly troublesome to the roadbuilders
was the prospect of being second-guessed on the "feasible and prudent
alternatives" issue. To demonstrate that thought had been given to
alternatives before a route had been selected, an arguably sufficient
showing under the Yarborough amendment to the federal-aid highway
legislation, section 138, would be one thing, but to prove that there
were in fact no feasible and prudent alternatives, as section 4(f) seemed
to require, would be quite another. Similarly, the Title 23 provision
seemed to leave the decision among alternatives to the state highway
department, provided "consideration" had been given to the alternatives,
whereas the language of section 4(f) seemed to suggest that this
decision was to be reviewed by the federal government.
Accordingly, a strong attempt was made in 1968 to trim section
4(f) back to the scope of section 138. The vehicle for this attempt was
the bi-annual highway authorization bill, which was to become the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, and which was handled by the
House and Senate Public Works Committees. The attack was led by
the House committee. The announced theory of the attack was that
the differences between sections 4(f) and 138 were confusing, and
that they should therefore be harmonized. 37 The method proposed was
36. "In view of the House mandate if the maritime [sic] remained in the bill,
the conference report would be rejected in the House and there would be no Depart-
ment of Transportation during this Congress. Our task became the 'art of the pos-
sible.'" 112 CONG. REC. 26564 (1966) (remarks of Senator Jackson, a conferee, in the
Senate debate on the conference report).
37. This is reflected by the HousE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT TO Ac-
COMPANY H.R. 17134, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1968, H.R. REP. No. 1584,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), which stated:
The difference in language between section 138 of title 23 and the comparable
provisions of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act is slight.
Both are concerned with criteria for highway planning in relation to the enumer-
ated land uses, however, and it is the committee's opinion that the language of
section 138, title 23 . . . should be controlling . . ..
Neither section 138 nor section 4(f) stands alone as the beacon lighting the
way to wisdom in the administration of our resources. Both are intended to
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to change section 4(f) to read more like section 138.38
Conservationists all over the country were aroused39 by this pro-
vision as well as by other aspects of the legislation. 40 Leadership for
the defense of section 4(f) centered in the Senate Public Works
Committee. Out of conference came a compromise version, which on
its face was a victory in most respects for the conservationists, with a
peculiar legislative history. Both section 4(f) of the DOT Act and
broaden, not narrow, the perspective in decision making. Parklands and his-
toric sites . . . have very real value . . . . No rational person would suggest,
however, that that value is the only one to be considered in a judgment as to
the best public interest. In weighing alternatives for highway location, equal
consideration must be given to other factors - to whether people will be dis-
placed; to whether existing communities will be disrupted; to whether the
established demand for adequate transportation . . . will be met; and to the
preferences of the people of the area involved. Preservation for use is sound
conservation philosophy, and it is in that perspective that both section 138 and
section 4(f) should be administered.
Id. 12 (emphasis added).
This approach contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court's rationale in con-
struing section 4(f) in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971). See note 96 infra and accompanying text. It was, however, considered
authoritative by FHWA engineers until the Supreme Court's decision.
38. Section 17 of the bill as reported by the House Committee would have
deleted everything in section 4(f) [see text accompanying note 34 supra] after "un-
less," through "minimize," and would have substituted; ". . . such program includes
all possible planning, including consideration of alternatives to the use of such land,
to minimize any .... ." HousE CoMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY
H.R. 17134, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1968, H.R. REP. No. 1584, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968).
39. Opposition to the House Committee's proposal was triggered by a minority
report, ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF THE HON. RICHARD D. MCCARTHY, OPPOSING SECTION
17 OF H.R. 17134, H.R. REP. No. 1584, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The report
stated :
The amendment . . . would abandon the standard that there must be no feasible
and prudent alternative before the transportation program or project can be
approved for construction through a park, recreation area, wildlife or water-
fowl refuge or historic site. Instead, the Committee's amendment would permit
any freeway, airport, railroad line, or any other type of transportation facility
to be constructed through such areas of . . . natural importance simply on the
basis that an engineer has given "consideration of alternatives." What does it
mean when an engineer states that he has "considered" an alternative? It could
mean he has given all of 5 minutes thought to an alternative but remains firmly
convinced that the route through a park is best because it is the straightest line
or requires the least land acquisition costs. Such attitudes have been advanced
in some cities, such as New Orleans, San Francisco, Washington - and such
attitudes have helped magnify the opposition to urban freeway construction ...
Id. 63-64.
40. Other controversial features of the House Bill related to the Interstate
system in the District of Columbia, including a provision purporting to require con-
struction of the Three Sisters Bridge. HousE CoMm. ON PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT TO
ACCOMPANY H.R. 17134, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1968, H.R. REP. No. 1584,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1968).
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section 138 were amended so as to be identical to each other. The
new common provision is set out below; the significant changes from
the 1966 version of section 4(f) are shown in italics:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special
effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the country-
side and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall
cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing
and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States
in developing transportation plans and programs that include
measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands
traversed. After the effective date of the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or
project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from
a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of
national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal,
State or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from
an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so deter-
mined by such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes
all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational
area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from
such use.41
Three changes are evident. First, a new "special effort" first sentence
was added. This was, however, a verbatim reproduction of the existing
section 2(b) (2) of the Department of Transportation Act, and was
substantially similar to the previous first sentence of section 138 which
called for a "maximum effort" to preserve parklands and historic sites.
Second, a new requirement was added to the final sentence of Section
4(f) that the parks, recreation areas and wildlife and waterfowl
refuges - but not historic sites - covered by that sentence be "publicly
owned." No similar requirdment, however, was imposed with respect
to the protection accorded the same categories of land under the first
sentence of that section (relating to the national policy that a "special
effort" be made to preserve such lands). Third, a further requirement
was added to the last sentence of section 4(f), but not to the first
sentence of section 4(f), that the protected lands be "of national, state
or local significance as determined by the Federal, State or local officials
having jurisdiction thereof."
These changes are susceptible to a reasonably straightforward
integration. A special effort should be made to preserve protected
41. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
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lands. In addition, if they are publicly owned and are officially considered
significant, more than a special effort is required. In such case the use
of protected land is illegal unless two conditions are met: first, that
there is no "feasible and prudent alternative"; and, in such case, that
there has been in addition "all possible planning to minimize harm."
The waters were somewhat muddied, however, by a "Statement
of the Managers on the Part of the House" which was attached to
the House print of the Conference Report and signed by the House
conferees but not by the Senate conferees. This "Statement" declared:
This amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended
to make it unmistakably clear that neither section constitutes a
mandatory prohibition against the use of the enumerated lands,
but rather, is a discretionary authority which must be used with
both wisdom and reason. The Congress does not believe, for
example, that substantial numbers of people should be required
to move in order to preserve these lands, or that clearly enunciated
local preferences should be overruled on the basis of this authority.'
The Senate conferees emphatically repudiated this Statement of
the House Managers. During the Senate debate on the conference
report they insisted that there had been no such agreement in the
conference, that the Statement was in their opinion inconsistent with
the language of the statute, and that, where the statutory requirements
have not been met, there is no discretion on the part of the Secretary
to permit the use of protected land. 8 They further developed the record
42. CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 3418, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF
1968, H.R. REP. No. 1799, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1968).
43. Mr. Cooper. . . . I invite the attention of the Senator from West Virginia
to the interpretation given in the report of the managers on the part of the
House. I believe it is wrong, and is contrary to our discussions in the confer-
ence. But most important - and I believe this in an interpretation that will hold -
it is contrary to the language of the section. There is nothing concerning dis-
cretion of the Secretary in the section itself.
I recall no discussion in the conference of any such intent. Furthermore,
the language of the section gives no discretion. If a local official, a State official,
or a Federal official having jurisdiction finds one of these areas or sites to be
of significance, there is no discretion given to the Secretary of Transportation
to permit its use for a highway. Will the Senator agree with me on that?
Mr. Randolph. I agree with what the distinguished Senator from Kentucky
has said in referring to the language of the House managers on page 32 of the
conference report. That, I say with due deference to the House, is the inter-
pretation of the House. It is not our interpretation. I agree with the Senator
from Kentucky. This is not as we believe it.
Mr. Cooper. The legislative language, if it is clear on its face, of course
must be interpreted that way. The language prohibits any intrusion upon or
invasion of these lands or areas if one of these bodies finds it is of National,
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at some length to the effect that even if local authorities declare pro-
tected land to be not significant and request a road through such land,
the Secretary has the discretion to refuse approval in order to preserve
parks and other protected lands."'
Notwithstanding the House Managers' "Statement," it would
appear clear from the language of the section that there is indeed a
"mandatory prohibition against the use of the enumerated lands" if
they have properly determined "significance" and if there is a "feasible
and prudent alternative," or, even if there is no such alternative, if the
project does not include "all possible planning to minimize harm."
It would have been difficult to reconcile a contrary view with the
language of the statute even if the Senate conferees had agreed with
the construction reflected in the House Managers' "Statement." In
view of the Senators' explicit disagreement with such an interpretation,
it cannot plausibly be argued from legislative history that the Congress,
as a whole, intended a construction inconsistent with the clear wording
of section 4(f).15
State or local significance, and the highway cannot be built, unless there is no
feasible and prudent alternative to doing so.
Mr. Randolph. I agree with the Senator.
114 CONG. REC. 24033 (1968).
44. Id.
45. This view is supported, inter alia, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d
1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000
(1972); Named Ind. Mem. of San Antonio Con. Soc'y v. Texas Hy. Dep't, 446 F.2d
1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 968 (1972) ; and in an opinion in the
Three Sisters Bridge case, District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe,
434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Three Sisters the question arose whether section
23 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 23, 82 Stat. 827,
which, as ultimately negotiated in conference, required the construction of the bridge
"as soon as possible in accordance with all applicable provisions of title 23 of the
United States Code," required compliance with environmental protection provi-
sions such as sections 128 and 138 of title 23, or with the Federal Highway Ad-
ministration's procedural requirement for environmental protection, FHWA Policy
and Procedure Memorandum 20-8 (Jan. 29, 1969), 23 C.F.R. App. A (1972) [here-
inafter cited as PPM 20-8]. Again there were unilateral interpretations in the same
Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House [see text accompanying note
42 supra], with which the Senate conferees apparently did not concur. The majority
opinion, by Judge Wright, stated, "The Conference Report contains no analysis
of the bill as passed." 434 F.2d at 444. "The 'Statement of the Managers ....'
was only appended to the Conference Report .... It did not represent the will
of the Senate conferees and can only be said to represent the personal opinions
of those who signed it." Id. at 444 n.38. In a concurring opinion Chief Judge
Bazelon, who found the statutory language ambiguous, stated that the "Statement
of the House Managers is of course entitled to respect in determining the legisla-
tive intent." Id. at 448. "It is not, however, entitled to the weight of a conference
report, since it [is] not signed by a majority of the Senate conferees." Id. at 448, n.4.
The Statement "cannot . . .supply the specificity necessary to make fine distinctions
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
The Secretary's authority under section 4(f) has never been dele-
gated to the operating administrations,46 with one partial exception in
since no basis for those distinctions can be found in the language chosen by the
legislative conferees." Id. at 448. The Bazelon opinion cites as precedent a 1935
ruling by the Speaker of the House. [ 79 CONG. REC. 12237-39 (1935)].
In Overton Park the Court considered, inter alia, the contention that the de-
cision of the Secretary to approve a road through a Memphis park, in accordance
with the preference of the local authorities that the road be located in the park
rather than elsewhere, was not subject to judicial review because, under 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (1970), this approval constituted "agency action . . . committed to
agency discretion by law." The Court rejected the contention with this explana-
tion: ". . . [T]he Secretary's decision here does not fall within the exception for
action 'committed to agency discretion . . . .' Section 4(f) . . . and § 138 . . . are
clear and specific directives . . . .This language is a plain and explicit bar to the
use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks - only the most
unusual situations are exempted." 401 U.S. at 410-11.
While the Court in Overton Park did not expressly discuss the Statement
of the Managers on the part of the House, the defendants' position on agency "dis-
cretion" was clearly based upon the "discretionary authority" language in that
Statement. The Supreme Court, moreover, overruled a district court opinion which
had specifically relied on the House Managers' Statement. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1195 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
The Fifth Circuit, in San Antonio, also did not address itself explicitly to
the Statement. It was faced, however, with a City Council resolution that certain
right-of-way lands in a park "are of primary local significance as part of the right-of-
way for the North Expressway and of secondary local significance as parts of park
and recreation areas." 446 F.2d at 1025-26. The court rejected the highway depart-
ment's argument that this constituted a finding of "no local significance." Instead,
the Fifth Circuit stated:
[the resolution] says that Brackenridge Park is of local significance as a Park,
but that the City Council would prefer to see it used for a highway. The ques-
tion, therefore, is whether Congress intended to leave the choice between parks
of local significance and federal-aid highways to local authorities; or whether
Congress, in passing section 4(f), has already made the choice between the two
uses. Only one construction fairly can be given to section 4(f), and that is that
46. From its inception the Department of Transportation has operated under a
pattern of formal delegations and retentions of the authorities vested in the Secretary
by the DOT Act. These administrative arrangements are formalized in departmental
orders which are codified in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. See 49 C.F.R.
§§ 1.43(a), 1.44(a)(1)-(2) (1972), which state, in substance, that all powers not
delegated by the Secretary in 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.43-65 (1972) are reserved to the Secre-
tary. Section 1.44(a) (2) further specifically provides that the delegations of au-
tority in 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.45-.51 (1972) (which concern delegations outside of the Office
of the Secretary) :
[D]o not extend to the following actions, authority for which is reserved to the
Secretary or his delegatee within the Office of the Secretary:
(2) Authority relating to transportation activities, plans, and programs under
section 4(f) and (g) of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C.
1653(f) and (g)), except for regulatory matters implementing section 4(f) for
programs administered by the Federal Aviation Administration.
49 C.F.R. § 1.44(a) (2) (1972) (emphasis added).
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the case of the FAA.4 ' During the Johnson Administration, under
Secretary Alan S. Boyd, it was intended within the Office of the
Secretary of Transportation that the section 4(f) functions would
ultimately be delegated, to be carried out in accordance with two pro-
Congress itself had made the choice between the two uses. Clearly, Congress
did not intend to leave the decision whether federal funds would be used to build
highways through parks of local significance up to the city councils across the
nation. If there was any doubt about this question before Overton Park, there
most assuredly is no longer any doubt ....
The Record in this case reveals that the state defendants relied heavily
on .. . [the Overton Park] district court opinion . . . . Now, of course, that
argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in reversing the dis-
trict court in Overton Park. We must conclude from the Supreme Court's
action that the Court attached little if any significance to the local officials'
preference to use Overton Park for highway right-of-way.
Id. at 1026-27.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in Arlington Coalition, stated:
In the 'significance' determination envisioned by Sections 138 and 4(f), the
desirability of using the particular parkland in question as a highway must be
ignored and only the value of the park as a park can be considered . . . .Were
this not so, land valuable to the community as a park could be used for a high-
way even though 'feasible and prudent alternatives' existed because federal or
state officials had decided that using the park for highway purposes was de-
sirable according to criteria other than whether such alternatives existed, the
only criterion allowed by the Acts.
458 F.2d at 1336.
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has employed loose language in de-
scribing the disputed paragraph from the House Managers' Statement as part of the
"conference report on the bill." Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett,
454 F.2d 613, 621 (3d Cir. 1971). Nevertheless, this court also rejected the "dis-
cretionary authority" concept. Citing San Antonio, the court stated, "This is not
to say that assuming the area is parkland the Secretary may rely upon a local pre-
ference as to its use." Id. at 622 n.10.
For a contrary point of view, see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV.
L. REv. 3, 323-24 (1971), which asserts that the Court:
[G]ave preponderant weight to the environmentalist policy expressed in the stat-
utes despite statutory language and legislative history suggesting that Congress
intended to give both the Secretary and local officials broader discretion to bal-
ance competing factors. Justice Marshall ignored the requirement that the af-
fected park must be .. .of national, State or local significance as determined
by the Federal, State or local officials having jurisdiction thereof. . . This
language suggests that local officials must initially decide whether municipal
parklands should be taken for highway construction.
While this Harvard Law Review position accurately reflects the pre-
Overton Park interpretation of section 4(f) by FHWA engineers, there is no ex-
plantation as to how the statutory language can be reconciled with the conclusion
presented. Reference is made instead to a Senate report on a bill which did not con-
tain the "significance" requirement. This report, however, did include one general
statement, not necessarily inconsistent with the Overton Park position on "signifi-
cance," that "the use of parklands properly protected and with damage minimized
by the most sophisticated construction techniques is to be preferred to the move-
47. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.43(a), 1.44(a) (2), 1.48(b)(1) (1972).
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cedural limitations. The first would have been the promulgation by
each operating administration of a regulation describing how it would
carry out section 4(f). These regulations would have included legal
interpretations of the section in accordance with the views of the De-
partment's General Counsel's Office. Another control was also con-
templated, in the form of an instruction from the Secretary to each
administrator that decisions in the course of administering the regula-
tion should be "coordinated" with the Office of the Secretary.4
In furtherance of this plan, Notices of Proposed Rulemaking were
prepared by the Coast Guard 49 and the FAA5" in 1968. In addition,
the Secretary delegated to the FAA the authority to promulgate section
4(f) regulations;51 he also instructed the Federal Aviation Admin-
istrator to coordinate with the Office of the Secretary.5"
This process of regulation, promulgation, and subsequent dele-
gation of authority was interrupted, however, by two developments.
ment of large numbers of people." S. REP. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1968).
The article also made reference to a House Public Works Committee Report on a
bill which had a different objective from the conference committee substitute, namely,
the dismantling of section 4(f) ; and to the "Conf. Rep." The survey article accuses
Justice Marshall of having:
[D]iscounted the Committee reports by giving equal weight to comments by Sena-
tors Randolph and Cooper declaring that . . . Congress intended to limit strictly
the Secretary's authority to approve the use of any park ... . However, Coin-
mitte-endorsed materials should warrant greater judicial consideration than re-
marks during floor debate, which are often uncontested and used to 'manufacture'
legislative history to support a particular application of statutory language.
85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 325 n.54 (1971). This argument overlooks the dynamic legisla-
tive history of policy conflict between the House and Senate on section 4(f). It
assumes a harmony in committee views which did not exist, and which would have
been inconsistent with the statutory language had it existed in the terms promoted
by the House. It distorts, moreover, the realities as to the opportuniy to manufacture
bogus legislative history. Senators Randolph and Cooper knew perfectly well what
victory they had won in conference on the language for section 4(f). The Statement
of Managers was drafted by the staff of the House committee, which had yielded
in conference on the statutory language; it was published in a House document,
uncontrolled by the Senate conferees or their staff assistants. As a formulation of
the views of the conferees, half of whom did not participate in its drafting and who
immediately repudiated it, its value as legislative history must be considered minimal.
48. This paragraph, and other statements in this article not otherwise referenced,
are based on my recollections from the period 1968-70 during which I directed the
Office of Environmental Impact and successor organizational units in the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation. The policy as to future delegation of section 4(f)
functions had been determined before my appointment.
49. The Coast Guard draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was never published
in the Federal Register.
50. 33 Fed. Reg. 7041 (1968).
51. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.44(a) (2), 1.47(h) (1972).
52. Memorandum from Secretary of Transportation Alan S. Boyd to the Fed-
eral Aviation Administrator, May 3, 1968.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
One was the enactment of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968,
which amended section 4(f) and rendered obsolete the Notices of
Proposed Rulemaking previously prepared by the Coast Guard and
the FAA. The other was an impasse between the staff of the Office
of the Secretary (OST) and the Federal Highway Administration
over the extent to which the FHWA's directives to federal highway
personnel and to the state highway departments should be issued in
the form of "regulations," as distinguished from being handled in the
same manner as the operational matters normally decided within the
operating administration. This led to the frustration of plans to proceed
Vith the delegation of authority to FHWA. Because of FHWA's
opposition a decision appeared unlikely on the adoption of this plan
as an overall DOT procedure. There was accordingly no follow-up
on the Coast Guard and FAA Notices of Proposed Rulemaking which
had been drafted in light of the 1966 version of section 4(f).
Therefore, at the time the Nixon Administration took office, the
administration of section 4(f) was in limbo; the section 4(f) authority
had not been delegated to the operating administrations of DOT. There
was no procedure for referring routine questions under section 4(f)
from the operating administrations to the Secretary or his staff. Major
issues of sufficient political interest between the Secretary and the
Federal Highway Administrator may have been resolved through
personal discussions. Decisions on less important matters were made,
if at all, within the FHWA, notwithstanding the absence of a delegation
of the authority to do so.
Shortly after taking office in 1969 the new Secretary, John A.
Volpe, reorganized the Department by establishing the Office of Assist-
ant Secretary for Urban Systems and Environment (soon afterwards
changed to Environment and Urban Systems)."' He issued a directive
that all matters in the Department which might involve section 4(f)
"must be coordinated" with the new office.54 Revisions of departmental
regulations made it even more explicit that the functions under both
section 4(f) and section 138 were reserved to the Secretary.5
53. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.23(d), 1.24(c) (1972).
54. Memorandum from Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe to Assistant
Secretaries, General Counsel, and all Administrators, April 25, 1969, reiterated in
Memorandum from the Secretary (signed by Acting Secretary James M. Beggs) to
all Administrators and Assistant Secretaries, July 3, 1969.
55. See note 46 supra. A further reorganization of DOT, possibly coming full
circle, was announced in 1973 shortly after Secretary Volpe was succeeded by Claude
S. Brinegar. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment and Urban
Systems was abolished and its environmental functions were transferred to a new
office, that of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Consumer Affairs.
346 [VOL. XXXll
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT
In late 1969 or early 1970, therefore, the practice developed of
processing for the Secretary's signature formal findings and deter-
minations in all section 4(f) cases. As this process was instituted it
became apparent that there were a number of apparently non-contro-
versial projects for the use of parklands which had been processed to
an advanced stage without consultation with the Secretary or the
staff of his Office. In these cases the state highway departments had
been permitted to proceed to the point where they were either about
to advertise for construction bids or had already done so. The circum-
stances were typically such that the Secretary could, and did in fact,
decide, when he was ultimately consulted, that there were no feasible
and prudent alternatives, and that all possible planning had been
included to minimize harm. It was evident, however, that before these
projects were held up in late 1969 or early 1970 in order to obtain
the Secretary's approval," the decisions to build had already been made,
either by the state highway department without consultation with BPR,
or by BPR without consultation with the Secretary.
If these cases reflect the practices which had prevailed in the
field between the enactment of section 4(f) in 1966 and the initiation
by FHWA in late 1969 of the routine referepce of section 4(f) decisions
to the Secretary, there may have been mn'ny approvals of projects to
use protected lands which were made by persons other than the
Secretary or his delegate.
III. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
A number of legal and policy problems have arisen which require
an interpretation of section 4(f). These problems have been com-
pounded by the aforementioned procedural issues concerning juris-
dictional authority within DOT. They have also been affected by policy
questions regarding federal-state and federal interdepartmental relations,
as well as by the differing traditions of the various programs affected
by section 4(f).
The Department's order further stated, "In separate documentation authority for
making 4(f) [sic] . . . environmental determinations is being delegated to the oper-
ating administrations." DOT Notice N 1100.37 (Feb. 5, 1973).
56. Examples of three such cases, relating to roads in Morgan City, Louisiana;
Ventura County, California; and Berea, Ohio are set out in 0. GRAY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 905-11 (1970). See also Morningside-Lenox
Park Assoc. v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ga. 1971), for an example of typical
planning for the use of parkland. In this case, despite numerous prior field-level
approvals, FHWA did not advise the state of the need for the Secretary's approval
under section 4(f) until January 30, 1970. 334 F. Supp. at 136.
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A. To What Activities Within DOT Does
This Section Apply?
Under the first sentence of section 4(f), the national policy that
a "special effort" be made to preserve protected lands evidently applies
to all activities within DOT. 7 As indicated above,58 the DOT programs
affected include, inter alia: the federal aid highway program; the activi-
ties of the FAA, including both grants to aid airport construction and
the allocation of the navigable airspace; all Coast Guard functions,
including the approval of bridges and causeways over navigable waters;
the Urban Mass Transportation Program; the Federal Railroad Admin-
istration; and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.
It is clear that in all these areas of DOT operation the Secretary
of Transportation should, under the first sentence of section 4(f), make
a "special effort" to preserve protected lands. Of considerable interest
to conservationist litigants is the question whether, under the last
sentence of section 4(f), he is legally prohibited from approving the
use of such lands in connection with the same range of activities
absent a "feasible and prudent alternative" and "all possible planning
to minimize harm."
The last sentence of section 4(f), the "... shall not approve.
provision, states that it applies to the approval of "any program or
project." This phrase echoes with a difference the original language of
section 138, which had required in 1966 that "the Secretary shall not
approve under section 105 of this title any program for a project which
requires the use for such project of any land from a ... park or historic
site . . .
Within the federal-aid highway program, which generates most
section 4(f) questions, the terms "program" and "project" could be
57. This policy statement is, indeed, not limited on its face to DOT activities,
and might be regarded as a general policy statement applicable to all federal func-
tions, and even to non-federal government activities. The general applicability of
section 2(b) (2) of the DOT Act [49 U.S.C. § 1651(b) (2) (1970)] would appear
to follow from the language of that section, although the intent of Congress is far
from clear. As passed by the Senate the section declared the policy that a "special
effort" to protect parks, etc., should be made ". . . in carrying out the provisions
of this Act . . . ." This limiting phrase was deleted in conference and the section
was otherwise approved as it had passed the Senate. See note 26 supra and ac-
companying text. The Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House attached
to the Conference Report stated: "Section 2 of the Senate amendment contained a
paragraph not included in the House bill which declared it to be the national policy
that in carrying out the provisions of the act, special effort should be made . . ..
The conference substitute conforms to the Senate amendment with a minor drafting
change." CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 15963, H.R. REP. No. 2236, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1966).
58. See notes 4-16 supra and accompanying text.
59. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (Supp. V 1969) (emphasis added).
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interpreted for section 4(f) purposes to have the same meaning as the
same terms had in section 138, that is, to refer to certain terms of
art in Title 23 of the U.S. Code which were familiar to the highway
program. 60 This would be satisfactory in one sense, in that all federal-
aid highway activities would ultimately be covered, sooner or later.
The Title 23 "program approval" or "project approval" may not, how-
ever, always be an entirely appropriate stage in the decision-making
process at which to inject section 4(f) considerations, in that the
occasion for such Title 23 approvals may occur after the corridor-
selection damage has already been done.
It is evident, however, that section 4(f) is meant to cover all
operations within DOT, and not just the highway program. Such
other activities have their own authorizing legislation which include
planning and operational procedures essentially unique to each program.
The procedures applicable to the non-highway programs in DOT have
no similarity to the complex legislative structure erected in Title 23
to cover the federal-aid highway program. Accordingly the terms "pro-
gram" and "project," as applicable at least to the non-highway opera-
tions, can hardly have been intended to refer to Title 23 terms of art,
since Title 23 applies only to the highway program, and not to other
DOT activities. Moreover, if "program" and "project" mean some-
thing other than these terms of art with respect to the non-highway
operations, they may very well mean that same something else with
respect to the highway program itself for purposes of section 4(f).
1. Applicability of the ". . . shall not approve.. ." Sentence
to Non-FHWA Approvals
Apart from the highway program, the issues which have arisen
within DOT as to the applicability of the last sentence of section 4(f)
have turned more on whether a "use" of protected land is the likely
consequence of an "approval," than on fine distinctions as to the meaning
of "program or project."
If any kind of approval within the Department's jurisdiction would
lead to the "use" of protected land, various institutional forces within
the Department would tend to influence the treatment of the issue as
a section 4(f) question. As a matter of internal organization, final
decisions under section 4(f) involve both the staff of the Office of
60. "Project" is defined for highway purposes in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1970) as
"an undertaking to construct a particular portion of highway, or if the context so
implies, the particular portion of a highway so constructed." "Programs" and
"projects" are further treated in 23 U.S.C. §§ 105-06 (1970).
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the Secretary6 l and that of the concerned operating administration
whereas non-section 4(f) processing is ordinarily handled solely by
the operating administration. 62 The Office of the Secretary of Trans-
portation (OST) staff elements principally responsible for section 4(f)
work are in the offices of an Assistant Secretary (formerly designated
TEU, now TES) and of the General Counsel (TGC). Because
of the public interest in environmental problems, the appropriateness
of such OST involvement is increasingly conceded (at least by the
operating administrations other than FHWA) wherever protected
lands may be affected in any way.
The Goleta Slough case provides an example of two such non-
highway borderline "program or project" questions, involving the Coast
Guard and potentially the FAA. The California Division of Highways
planned to build a freeway from the vicinity of Goleta, near Santa
Barbara, to the University of California at Santa Barbara. The road
would have crossed a shallow, marsh-like channel, the Goleta Slough,
located largely on the grounds of the Santa Barbara Municipal Airport.
Conservationists objected on a number of grounds, including the im-
portance of the Slough for wildlife.
Federal funds were not requested for the road. The Department
of Transportation became involved in the controversy because of ques-
tions as to two non-financial approvals. First, because of relatively
higher elevation to the west of the Slough, a bridge crossing was
planned; if the Slough were considered "navigable," such a bridge
would require a Coast Guard "permit" under 33 U.S.C. § 401.3
Secondly, the land had been deeded by the federal government to the
airport subject to the restriction that it be used solely for airport pur-
poses, but the FAA could grant a release from this restriction for uses
consistent with the property's suitability for airport use.
The Coast Guard bridge permit was denied in 1970. It was
announced 64 that the Slough was considered navigable, that there was
61. See note 55 supra and accompanying text; DOT Order No. 5610.1 (Oct. 1,
1970).
62. OST staff would be involved in some non-section 4(f) matters, such as
those arising under section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 [42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970)], and portions of section 16 of the Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 [49 U.S.C. § 1712(g) (1970)]. Memorandum from Secre-
tary Volpe to all Administrators and Assistant Secretaries, Feb. 26, 1970; DOT
Order No. 5610.1 (Oct. 1, 1970).
63. The function of approving such bridges was transferred from the Secretary
of the Army to the Secretary of Transportation by section 6(g) (6) (A) of the DOT
Act [49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)(6)(A) (1970)], and were delegated by the Secretary to
the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(c) (8) (1972).
64. Letter from John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation to Mr. J.A.
Legarra, California State Highway Engineer, April 16, 1970, reproduced with com-
ments in 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 911-13 (1970).
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no objection to the bridge for reasons of navigation, but that approval
would be withheld because of section 4(f) of the DOT Act. The denial
was predicated on the absence of a showing that there was no feasible
and prudent alternative to the proposed road. The Coast Guard
treated the Slough as a de facto wildlife preserve and recreational area,
although it was not formally designated as such. There was some
ambiguity in the DOT announcement as to which sentence of section
4(f) was being invoked, but it appears that the third (". . shall not
approve any program or project . . .") sentence was conceived to be
the basis for the action. The bridge itself would not have directly used
land from the Slough; the physical construction which would have
required such "use" was the road to which the bridge would have led.
The approval which was considered forbidden by section 4(f) was
clearly not the conventional Title 23 "project approval" of the road
project since there was no federal-aid highway project to be approved
under Title 23; it was instead the Coast Guard bridge permit. The
prohibited action, therefore, was necessarily viewed in non-Title 23
terms.
A number of variations can be imagined as to the definition of
the "project," or the "program," or the concept of approval for
section 4(f) purposes. In fact, however, no attempt was made to
specify a choice among such alternatives. Instead the case was treated
as if section 4(f) applied to any decision within DOT which might make
the difference as to whether protected lands would be subjected to "use"
other than uses for the purposes for which they are protected.
A close question would have arisen if it had been necessary to
decide whether an FAA release of a restriction in the airport's deed
would be required in order for the road project to proceed, and, if so,
whether the granting of such a release would constitute approval of a
"program or project" for section 4(f) purposes. There was no need
for a final ruling on these questions. Apparently, however, the Secre-
tary of Transportation had considered in 1968 that the decision as to
such a release would be subject to section 4(f)." In light of inter-
vening events it would seem unlikely that the FAA would have
attempted to make such a decision in 1970 without consultation with
OST and the Secretary in the manner of a section 4(f) case.
2. Implications of the ". . . shall not approve ... " Sentence
for FHWA Approvals
For the FHWA as well as the Coast Guard and the FAA, it
would appear that the non-delegated section 4(f) function, particularly
65. Letter from Alan S. Boyd, Secretary of Transportation, to Mr. Frederick
Eissler, Conservation Chairman, Los Padres Chapter, Sierra Club, Aug. 21, 1968.
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under the third (". . . shall not approve . . .") sentence, is a general
responsibility to assure that operating decisions which, in the absence
of section 4(f), would normally have been made within one of these
operating administrations are reviewed instead by the Secretary under
section 4(f) if the result would be determinative as to the potential
"use" of protected lands. This would require a section 4(f) review
of meaningful operating decisions before the time of the Title 23
"program" or "project" approval of the construction within the pro-
tected land.
The meaningful highway decision for section 4(f) purposes may
be made upon the approval of a general corridor which will in any
way ultimately involve the use of protected land. Such a decision can
also be made when, within a previously approved corridor, approval
is granted to a specific project which, if constructed, would diminish
the feasibility of subsequent routing of other projects so as to avoid
protected land.
The relevance of these decisions to section 4(f) is obscured if
the "program or project" concepts in section 4(f) are thought of
solely in Title 23 terms. Often the decision which ultimately turns
out to have been determinative is labelled as something different from
a "program" or "project" approval. For instance, in FHWA's admin-
istrative parlance it may be called an "engineering" approval. Yet the
purposes of section 4(f) would clearly be frustrated if by means of
such "engineering" approvals a plan were approved for the construction
of a highway to opposite sides of a significant park, without reference
to the requirements of section 4(f). In such a case it would hardly
be persuasive to argue that section 4(f) is not applicable because no
Title 23 "program" or "project" approvals had been given for a con-
struction contract through the park itself. The process would be reduced
to an absurdity in such a case regardless of how the connecting link
were subsequently proposed to be completed. If the link through the
park were to be financed as a federal-aid highway, an alternative might
no longer be "feasible" or "prudent" after construction was completed
on both sides of the park, despite the fact that an alternative corridor to
avoid the park entirely might have been found feasible and prudent had
the section 4(f) conditions been applied before the approval of the
flanking projects.6" If federal funds were withheld from the connecting
66. Two contrary points of view appear in the decisions as to whether an adminis-
trator who must decide whether to approve, reject or alter a proposed public works
undertaking may take into account previous investments in that undertaking. The
position that he should take previous investments into account is reflected most
clearly in a line of cases under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) § 102(2)(C)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970), which requires that
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link, so that it would instead be financed solely as a state project, the
parkland would still have been used without compliance with the
section 4(f) requirements as a result of DOT's approval of the overall
plan for a corridor requiring such parkland use. 7 The same conclusion
environmental impact statements be filed in connection with certain projects. E.9 .,
Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000 (1972)'; Morning-
side-Lennox Park Assoc. v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Yet in
section 4(f) cases, the tendency is not to approve illegal routes just because an in-
vestment has already been made. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), the court stated:
We further ruled, at . . . pre-trial conference, that defendants would not be en-
titled to show the amount of money that would, so to speak, go down the drain
with an abandonment of the route through the park. We so ruled because it was
dramatically clear at the time of the Secretary's determination in November,
1969 and at the time of the presentation of this case in the Supreme Court that
condemnation and removal of buildings was almost complete on the park route
and yet the opinion of the Court . . . omits this as a proper factor for consid-
eration ....
335 F. Supp. at 877.
The district court similarly ruled that the Secretary, in "weighing the com-
munity disruption factor" relevant to the determination whether an alternative might
be "feasible and prudent" [see notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text] could not
"consider the fact that the disruption on the park route had already occurred while
disruption on another route would be new and additional." Id. Accord, Arizona Wild-
life Fed'n v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1637, 1639 (D. Ariz. 1972) where the court stated'
"In considering the relief requested, the fact that this is the mid-segment of a new
highway, the two ends of which have been completed, is without significance in this
proceeding." A possible reason for the approach under NEPA differing from that
under section 4(f) is that section 102(2) (C) (5) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970),
includes, as a relevant consideration, the study of "any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it
be implemented." Such a study may also be necessary in connection with the de-
tailed statement on "alternatives to the proposed action" called for by section
102(2) (C) (iii) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
NEPA may require less in the area of environmental protection than the
"paramount importance" test for section 4(f) announced by the Supreme Court in
Overton Park. See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
67. In an analogous situation it has been held that the Secretary of Transporta-
tion may not approve part of a "project," by fragmenting it into segments, if another
segment of the same "project" requires a section 4(f) determination. Named Ind.
Mem. of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 968 (1971). This decision turned, in part, on the
prior administrative determination of the scope of the "project." Apart, however,
from the narrow holding that section 4(f) does not authorize the fragmenting of
projects, the court based its decision on policy grounds.
The frustrating effect such piecemeal administrative approvals would have on
the vitality of section 4(f) is plain for any man to see. Patently, the construc-
tion of these two "end segments" to the very border, if not into, the Parklands,
will make destruction of further parklands inevitable, or, at least, will severely
limit the number of "feasible and prudent" alternatives to avoiding the Park.
The Secretary's approach to his section 4(f) responsibilities thus makes a joke
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follows if the FHWA were in any way to approve a corridor which
would use protected land, even if portions of the flanking projects
as well as the park construction itself were to be financed with state
funds. Furthermore, if such an "engineering approval" or other form
of the "feasible and prudent" alternatives standard, and we not only decline to
to give such an approach our imprimatur, we specifically declare it unlawful.
Id. at 1023.
The court similarly held that, once having sought federal funding, the state
subjected itself to federal law for purposes of the project, and could not thereafter
evade section 4(f) by building any part of it with state funds. Id. at 1027-28. See
also Township of Hopewell v. Volpe, 2 ERC 1089 (D.N.J. 1969), aff'd on other
grounds. 446 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding as to the applicability of other argu-
ably analogous provisions of title 23 at stages of the highway planning process prior
to the request for federal funds) ; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), where "location approval" was sought under 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) as
a pre-requisite to a possible subsequent request for federal funds. The case held that
"projects that may eventually receive federal funds." on which "states keep open the
option . . . by securing federal approval at various stages," are covered by section
4(f). Id. at 227.
If, however, the project does not involve federal funds or approvals, and has
not been so structured for purposes of evading section 4(f), the section would ap-
pear not to apply. Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1160 (W.D.N.C.)
(semble), aff'd, 459 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972), reached such a result regarding the
non-applicability of NEPA to a locally financed loop road, notwithstanding its link-
age with federal traffic arteries, where the use of "city funds only is not a device or
subterfuge to evade environmental considerations .... " Accord, Bradford Township
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972). But cf.
Ecos, Inc. v. Volpe, 5 ERC 1019, 1022 (M.D.N.C. 1973) which held that pro-
visions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47
(1970), concerning "major Federal action" [Id. § 4332(c)] apply to a 100% state-
financed highway segment which "is ... part and parcel of the East-West Express-
way where substantial federal funds have already been expended and are proposed
to be expended and thus must be controlled by applicable federal procedural require-
ments."
A distinction has been drawn between Federal-aid highway planning and
federal airport-grant planning, in determining whether a request for federal financial
assietance makc construction contracted with non-federal funds "federal" for pur-
poses of permitting such construction to be enjoined because of non-compliance with
section 4(f) and other federal environmental protection requirements, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970)]. See, e.g.,
City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972). In this case the Massachusetts
Port Authority applied for an FAA grant under 49 U.S.C. § 1716 (1970) for the
construction of an outer taxiway at Logan Airport. The FAA made a "tentative
allocation of funds" under an administrative procedure provided in 14 C.F.R. § 151
(1972). The Boston Redevelopment Authority objected to the project because of threats
of noise and future harbor filling. In the meantime, the Port Authority awarded a con-
struction contract and construction began. The FAA refused to process the application
further without a detailed environmental impact statement [see notes 69, 91 in!ra].
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against further construction on a ground
analogous to that used in Son Antonio, that the Port Authority itself was precluded
from proceeding without compliance with the "special effort" clause of section 4(f),
with NEPA, and with certain other requirements applicable to federal projects. The
First Circuit affirmed the denial of the injunction, suggesting that the significance of
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of decision were to be made by an FHWA official without the
Secretary's personal approval, it would be additionally unauthorized
because of the Department's reservation of section 4(f) authority to
the Secretary.
This line of reasoning may lead to a number of awkward conse-
quences for two reasons. One reason is that the federal-aid highway
program has in fact been administered in many instances since 1966 as
if section 4(f) did not apply to these determinative decisions, and
frequently as if the authority to make such decisions had been delegated
to FHWA personnel. Secondly, at least until recently highways have
often been deliberately routed through open space in urban areas, in
preference to the demolition of homes or commercial or industrial sites.
It is accordingly desirable that the need be faced for a definition
of "program or project" in non-title 23 terms in the case of highways,6"
preliminary approval is different in the case of airports from that in the case of high-
ways. The court stated that after "tentative allocation" stage of airport planning
approval:
[T]he whole of a proposed airport project . . . is in the ordinary course given
closer scrutiny before final decision . . . than is a highway project after
highways location approval . . . . The staged federal approval system for high-
ways may be likened to the successive reviews of an architect's plans, begin-
ning with a broad conceptual rendering of a house in its setting and ending with
detailed drawings of plumbing, outlets, and joists. The more simple approval
scheme for airport development grants is closer to that of one who first selects
qualified bidders and then awards the contract.
464 F.2d at 259.
The First Circuit's emphasis on a comparison of the FAA's "tentative allo-
cation" procedure with the "location approval" stage of highway planning was based
on the observation that in all cases where a court had found a highway project to be
"federal," the stage of "location approval" had been reached. The courts in those
cases, however, did not rely on the degree of approval, however tentative, which
had been granted, or on the closeness of the scrutiny to which the project would be
subjected thereafter before final approval. Instead, the courts in San Antonio and
La Raza Unida emphasized a concept more like waiver or estoppel. The mere
request for federal financing, or the mere keeping open of options to request federal
financing later, should preclude a state from proceeding with its own funds without
compliance with federal environmental protection requirements.
Since Brackenridge and Olmos parks were the inspiration for the Yar-
borough amendments which led to section 4(f) [see text at part IB supra], it is
ironic that the San Antonio decision led to a strong congressional drive to exempt
these parks from the protection of section 4(f). In the 92d Congress, to which Sena-
tor Yarborough had not been re-elected, both the House and the Senate passed
versions of a proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972 which purported to de-
federalize the project involved in the San Antonio case, by permitting Texas to
repay federal funds previously advanced for that highway. The bill died at the end
of the session, on a point of order. See note 195 infra. The issue was left to be de-
bated anew in the 93d Congress, where individual exceptions to section 4(f) were
opposed in principle by the Secretary of Transportation.
68. The approach suggested in the text is supported by Thompson v. Fugate,
347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972), which dealt with a segment of the Richmond
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just as such a definition is already clearly required in the case of
DOT's non-highway activities. Otherwise the review of decisions which
may affect protected lands will not be made when it can most reasonably
be done. The decisions will otherwise too often come up when it is
unnecessarily difficult to save the protected lands - either when alterna-
tives are no longer feasible and prudent which might have been feasible
and prudent, or when the required action, although feasible and prudent,
is more expensive than it might have been with different planning from
the beginning.
Some recognition of this problem is reflected in a relatively recent
development. In August 1971 FITWA issued instructions on the
formulation of environmental impact statements required under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.9 These instructions also
applied to the processing of section 4(f) determinations, the need for
which was made evident by the content of such environmental impact
statements under NEPA. In discussing the size of the undertaking
which should be the subject of such statements and determinations, the
Metropolitan Beltway. Most of the 75-mile beltway was to be built as part of the
Interstate system. The remainder had been designated as Virginia Route 288. The
29.2 miles of Route 288 had been approved as part of the federal-aid primary system,
but no federal funds had yet been committed. Plaintiffs sought to protect Tuckahoe,
a National Register historic site [see note 77 infra] through which a segment of
Route 288, which had not yet been submitted for federal location approval, would
pass. The court stated, "The beltway . . . must be viewed as a whole, and at the
very least, Route 288 must be so viewed . . . . The highway project with which
we are concerned cannot be fractionalized." Id. at 124. The court accordingly en-
joined defendants "from taking any steps leading to the condemnation of any portion
of the property known as Tuckahoe Plantation". Id. at 128. Defendant Volpe was
"enjoined from granting any further approval or federal assistance to any part of
the highway commonly known as the Tuckahoe Segment." Id. The action of the
court may fall short of the full implications of its language, inasmuch as it is not
clear whether work on non-Tuckahoe segments was enjoined and the completion
of such worfk may narrow the options available in considering proposals for the
Tuckahoe segment. See also Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167
(S.D. Iowa 1972), where the term "project" is apparently used in non-title 23 terms
to describe that portion of a proposed state-wide freeway which lies in a given
county. An environmental impact statement under NEPA [42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47
(1970)] had been filed on the northern "segment," but none was proposed to be filed
on the southern "segment" because it had received "design approval" before the
effective date of NEPA [see text section II D infra]. The court enjoined all work
on the entire country-wide "project" until an environmental impact statement was
filed covering the entire county-wide "project." It is not clear from the opinion
whether the "segments" might constitute title 23 "projects," or whether this is a
situation similar to San Antonio where a title 23 "project" was fragmented into
"segments." A seven-mile stretch of freeway which is considered separately for
"design approval and construction purposes" would typically be a "project" under
23 U.S.C. §§ 105-06 (1970).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970) requires all agencies of the federal government
to include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
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instruction uses a new concept, called a "highway section." This is
explained in general terms, including the notion that the "section"
should comprise "a substantial length of highway between logical
termini," which might be the subject of multi-year financing.7" While
this concept is imprecise, it constitutes some evidence that FHWA
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall con-
sult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies
of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State,
and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accom-
pany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.
The statute has been construed broadly as to the scope of its concerns. See,
e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Hanly v. Kleindienst,
409 U.S. 990 (1972), where the court stated:
The . . . act contains no exhaustive list of so-called 'environmental considera-
tion,' but without question its aims extend beyond sewage and garbage and
even beyond water and air pollution .... The Act must be construed to include
protection of the quality of life for city residents. Noise, traffic, overburdened
mass transportation systems, crime, congestion and even availability of drugs
all affect the urban 'environment' and are surely results of the 'profound influ-
ences of . . . high density urbanization [and] industrial expansion' .
Id. at 647.
Unlike section 4(f), NEPA is for the most part procedural, rather than
substantive, in the sense that it does not prohibit environmental damage; instead it
imposes requirements on the planning process to asure that environmental conse-
quences are identified and articulated before decisions are made. Ely v. Velde, 451
F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650,
656 (10th Cir. 1971). Contra, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers, 4 ERC 1721 (8th Cir. 1972), which argues that NEPA "[i]s more than an
environmental full-disclosure law," that "NEPA was intended to effect substantive
changes in decision making," and that "courts have an obligation to review . . .
agency decisions [under the substantive requirements of NEPA] on the merits." Id.
at 1725. The same position is advanced in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froehlke, 4 ERC 1829 (8th Cir.), aff'g 348 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1972). For a
discussion of the difference between NEPA methodological requirements and the
section 4(f) value preferences, see Note, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L. REV.
1117 (1972).
.70. FWHA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1 § 3a, at 6 (Aug. 24, 1971,
as amended, Sept. 7, 1972) [hereinafter cited as PPM 90-1].
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itself now perceives the need to consider section 4(f) questions within
a context broader than the Title 23 definitions of "program" and
"project," and at a stage in the planning process prior to the "ap-
provals," "programs," and "projects" provided for in Title 23."'
B. What Constitutes "Use" of Protected Land?
Ordinarily in DOT programs the last sentence of section 4(f),
which provides that "the Secretary shall not approve any program
or project which requires the use of [protected lands]", has been viewed
as preventing activities which involve the physical occupation of pro-
tected land. Such occupation arises either by construction of works
upon the land as part of a DOT-financed and approved project, or,
as in the Goleta Slough case, by other (non DOT-financed) construction
which would be required on the protected land under the same overall
program of which the DOT activity is a part. Off-site activities may,
however, also be governed by the sentence if they should generate
sufficiently serious impacts on the land as to impair substantially the
utility of the land for the purposes for which it was used before the
off-site DOT activity was undertaken.
There has been little litigation concerning the meaning of "use."
In one case, however, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the encirclement
of an alpine campground by a freeway is a "use" of the recreational
area for purposes of section 4(f), and has stated: "The word 'use'
is to be construed broadly . . . in cases where environmental impact
appears to be a substantial question." '72
71. It has been held, for purposes of the NEPA requirements for "a detailed
statement on ... alternatives to the proposed action" and for a "study" of "appropri-
ate alternatives" [42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2) (C) (iii), 4332(2) (D) (1970)], which raise
questions similar to those under section 4(f) concerning the appropriate length of
highway to be considered in connection with "alternatives," that:
If an impact statement is prepared with respect to a small length of a pro-
posed highway, . . . [the] requirements of adequate consideration of alternatives
cannot be complied with . . . . While no precise mileage for an appropriate
length can be specified, the test is whether the length selected assures adequate
opportunity for the consideration of alternatives (both whether and where
to build) required by the Act.
Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 740 (D. Conn. 1972).
72. Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1972). DOT, moreover,
has recognized the principle that a transportation project can be physically separated
from a protected area and still constitute a "use" within the meaning of section 4(f).
DOT Reprint of Statement of Herbert F. DeSimone, Assistant Secretary of Trans-
portation for Environment and Urban Systems, before the Senate Committee on
Commerce Regarding S. 728, May 3, 1971. In this statement he said that DOT "has
adopted . . . [a] broader meaning" of section 4(f) so as to "provide protection" in
situations where "a transportation facility is located adjacent to a protected area but
does not require the taking of land from it" in "the physical sense, but would sub-
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1. FAA Problems as to "Use"
The "use" of land concept is particularly difficult as applied to
FAA activities as contrasted with the highway program. In some cases
the effect of an FAA approval is the same as that of an FHWA
approval; for instance, if FAA approves a grant toward the construc-
tion of an airport upon protected land, the applicability of section 4(f)
is obvious. If, however, the FAA approval involves flights over
protected land, instead of physical construction upon it, more complex
questions arise.
The effect of overflights could be so disruptive as to amount
to a taking,73 in which case it might be fair to consider that "use" of
the land is involved for section 4(f) purposes. On the other hand some
park and recreation uses are considered entirely compatible with nearby
airport developments. Indeed the FAA encourages local airport author-
ities to provide for land use controls so that lands over which over-
flights would be entirely disruptive are brought under airport owner-
ship. Under such controls other adjacent lands which might be suitable
for special uses, such as recreation, are developed as golf courses and
the like. There is no evidence that Congress intended to discourage
stantially interfere with the use to which that land is dedicated." Id. at 4. Senate Bill
728, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972), as introduced by Senators Hartke and Hart, would
have, inter alia, added the words " . . . has an adverse effect on the environment
in . . ." before "requires the use of land from ..." in section 4(f).
During the 1969 controversy concerning the Miami Jetport, near the Ever-
glades National Park, the view was expressed within the Department of the Interior,
with which DOT did not disagree, that:
[O]verflights, if sufficiently low and frequent, could involve a taking of property
rights, . . . [and that] although the issue is not completely free from contro-
versy, this office would view the term "use" as it appears in section 4(f) to be
sufficiently broad . .. to include overflights of such a level that a private land-
owner would be oititled to compensation for a taking of a property right . . .
[and] could include constructive use which operates to limit or prevent use of
the park or conservation of lands by the public for their intended purposes.
Memorandum from Bernard R. Meyer, Associate Solicitor, Parks and Recreation,
to Solicitor, Department of the Interior, May 29, 1969. DOT differed only on the
question of whether park overflights attributable to the jetport would in fact be "suf-
ficiently low and frequent."
73. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; United States' v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400 348 P.2d 664
(1960). A related question is unsettled: whether aircraft noise, perhaps as loud
as from an overflight, but resulting from flights not directly over the affected land,
can give rise to a similar claim for "inverse condemnation." Compare Batten v.
United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) (claimant's damages conceded, but con-
demnation recovery denied under Tucker Act) [28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970)]
'with Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) (inverse con-
demnation claim allowed) [and] Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 3 ERC 1779, 1780
(Super. Ct. 1970).
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such land use planning by establishing a presumption against all flights
over parks or recreation areas as such, or over historic sites.
This approach may, however, overlook important residual prob-
lems. It is conceivable that noise from overflights might fall short of a
taking and yet seriously impair some park and recreation functions,
such as the enjoyment of concerts or the appreciation of some historic
sites. Furthermore, while overflights may be reasonably suitable over
some park and recreational activities, such as baseball, they can be
seriously annoying for others, such as the quest for solitude in the
wilderness.7" A troublesome dilemma is accordingly posed for the con-
scientious administrator. If he should construe the "use" of protected
lands, under the third sentence of section 4(f), to encompass over-
flights which amount to less than a taking, the section would inhibit
land use planning (such as the siting of ballparks near airports) which
can be highly desirable from the point of view of environmental controls,
and which Congress probably had no intention of curtailing. He might
74. See, e.g., The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970) which
provides for the preservation of "wilderness areas." These are areas:
[I]n contrast with those . . . where man and his own works dominate the land-
scape . . . where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is
further defined to mean . . . an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its
primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condi-
tions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the
forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2)
has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type
of recreation ....
Id. § 1131(c) (emphasis added). A quest for solitude is apparently, therefore, only
one type of wilderness recreation, not the only type. To the extent that the defining
characteristics of wilderness turn on the transitory impact of man, and the oppor-
tunity for "a primitive and unconfined type of recreation," aircraft overflights are
not necessarily incompatible with the wilderness. Yet preserving the opportunity
for solitude is clearly one of the objectives of the Act, and presumably one which
should be achievable somewhere, even if it need not be capable of realization every-
where. Unless a conscious effort is made to route audible overflights away from some
wilderness areas, however, there may be no such areas suitable for solitude undis-
tracted by mechanical noise. Freedom from mechanical noise is explicitly relevant
to the Act's objectives; with certain exceptions, roads are prohibited in wilderness
areas, as well as the use of "motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats,"
other forms of "mechanical transport," and the landing of aircraft. Id. § 1133(c)
(emphasis added). Yet the statutory requirements for such silence are not absolute.
Exceptions are available for certain commercial [Id. §§ 1133(c), (d) (3)] and ad-
ministrative purposes. Id. § 1333(c). It is generally assumed that the Wilderness
Act does not itself authorize the prohibition of aircraft overflights, but only landings,
despite a somewhat unclear provision that "[w]ithin wilderness areas . . . the use
of aircraft or motorboats, where these uses have already become established, may be
permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture
deems desirable." Id. § 1133(d)(1) (emphasis added).
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also face totally unworkable limitations in the use of available airspace;
and he might be forced by whatever adjustments he makes in flight
patterns to intensify noise problems over residential areas. If, however,
he should ignore the sub-taking overflight problem over all protected
lands, he would certainly be participating to some extent in the degrada-
tion of values which section 4(f) was intended to protect.
A practical solution may be to rely on the first "... special effort
." sentence of section 4(f), rather than on the last "... shall not
approve . . ." sentence. Under this approach a sub-taking overflight
would not be considered a "use." Accordingly, there would not be an
automatic presumption against flights over all protected lands. The
FAA would still be obligated to make a "special effort" to "preserve"
protected lands, as well as "the natural beauty of the countryside,"
which might include aural as well as visual aesthetic values. In such
cases, where the limitations of overflights would be relevant to the
preservation of the protected values, the FAA would be under an
obligation at least to try, and could be held accountable to demonstrate
what effort was made.
The FAA would be free under this theory to experiment with
overflight limitations over specific portions of wilderness areas, without
conceding the obligation to impose such limitations over all of a wilder-
ness area, or over all wilderness areas. If the overflights are not a
"use," they are not subject to a blanket prohibition, and reasonable
limitations could be tailored consistent with actual airspace requirements
in the exercise of an appropriate "special effort."
Some reluctance may be experienced on the part of FAA personnel
who would like to make such an effort, but who might fear that this
would be prejudicial to the necessary operations of aircraft over
populated areas. They may anticipate the argument that if, for instance,
a five thousand foot minimum altitude is prescribed over a wilderness,75
75. A 5,000 foot minimum on flights over Everglades National Park was im-
posed by DOT on aircraft using the Miami Jetport training facility, with an ex-
ception for one limited area, comprising about nine miles square, where altitudes to
3,000 feet were permitted under instrument flight conditions when required for sepa-
ration safety. However, take-off and landing patterns at the training site were
totally prohibited from overflying the Park. Letter from John A. Volpe, Secretary
of Transportation, to Senators Case, Hart, Jackson, and Nelson, Oct. 29, 1969,
reprinted in 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1022, 1023
(1970). Because of these limitations it was not thought that the jetport constituted
a "use" of the Park. A subsequent "Everglades Jetport Pact," negotiated in Janu-
ary 1970 under the leadership of the Department of the Interior with respect to en-
vironmental considerations, is less explicit; it provides for rules to "limit all train-
ing operations for overflying the Everglades National Park at altitudes below 5,000
feet, except when operating under instrument flight rules." 0. GRAY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1030, 1034 (1970). Under the Pact, therefore,
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citizens in the flight path near an urban airport would demand equal
treatment. This concern assumes that the only position commercial
aviation can assert to the citizen is the pretense that overflight noise
is not unpleasant, and that this position would be undermined by any
effort to minimize such noise anywhere. It would, however, be reason-
able to recognize that such noise is unpleasant to most people; that
it is not always possible to prevent it; but that, where it can be limited,
a special effort should and will be made to do so, over both wilderness
and populated areas.
2. "Use" of vs. "Effect" on Historic Sites
In addition to the prohibition against approving the "use" of
historic sites under the last sentence of section 4(f), the Secretary of
Transportation must, under section 106 of the National Historic Preser-
vation Act of 1966,76 "take into account the effect" of any "under-
taking" on any property included in the National Register of Historic
Places,7" and must "afford the Advisory Council on Historic Preserva-
tion . . . a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such
undertaking.""8
The Advisory Council considers an undertaking to have an "effect"
on a National Register property "when any condition of the under-
taking creates a change in the historical, architectural, archeological or
cultural character that qualified the property . . . for listing in the
National Register."7  It assumes that an "adverse effect occurs in
it is less clear than under the original DOT restrictions that take off and landing
overflights are to be prohibited at all altitudes, and the exception for instrument flight
rule conditions is to be limited to a specific area, and to be subject to a 3,000 foot
altitude floor.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970).
77. The National Register, authorized pursuant to section 101(a)(1) of the
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)l (1970), is maintained
by the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior. It lists "districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture,
archeology, and culture." It has been estimated that over 200,000 places will ulti-
mately be included. Conversation with Dr. Sidney Bredford, Department of the In-
terior, June 24, 1971.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970). The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
was established by section 201 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,
16 U.S.C. § 470i (1970). It is composed of twenty members: ten are appointed by
the President from outside the federal government; eight are federal administrative
heads (the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, Commerce,
Agriculture, Treasury, and Transportation, the Attorney General, and the Adminis-
trator of the General Services Administration), and the remaining two are the Sec-
retary of the Smithsonian Institution and the Chairman of the National Trust for
Historic Preservation. Id. § 470i(a) (1970).
79. The Advisory Council's "Effect Criteria" are set out at 37 Fed. Reg. 5429-30
(1972). These "Effect Criteria" in turn refer to the National Park Services "Na-
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conditions which include but are not limited to . . . isolation from or
alteration of its surrounding environment" and "introduction of visual,
audible, or atmospheric elements that are out of character with the
property and its setting.""0
If an historic site is listed on the National Register, therefore,
an "effect" which might not be considered a "use" for purposes of
section 4(f) could still require protective attention from the Secretary
under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Noise and other
"visual . . . or atmospheric elements" clearly need not amount to a tak-
ing to be out of character with the property and its setting. An off-
site interference with the view at an historic site could be considered
such an "effect" in cases where it would be difficult to demonstrate
that the project in question "uses" any land from the site. For in-
stance, such questions have been raised over a proposed bridge in
Baltimore harbor, which might spoil the visual setting in which Fort
McHenry is situated. The bridge could hardly be considered to "use"
Fort McHenry, but it might well be considered to affect it." Other,
more nearly borderline cases as to "use" pose proportionately less
difficulty in qualifying as an "effect" under these criteria.
Similarly, an increase of traffic through a nearby historic district
might result from the financing of a highway project or from the
approval of a bridge. The highway or bridge would not physically
occupy land from the historic district. Regardless of the arguments
which could be mustered for or against the proposition that, never-
theless, the traffic consequences themselves constitute a section 4(f)
"use," little effort is required to qualify such consequences as section
106 "effects," which must at least be taken "into account," and on
which the Advisory Council must have an opportunity to comment.82
tional Register Criteria." Id. at 5429. The latter criteria declare the quality of
"significance in American history, architecture, archeology and culture" to be present
in "districts, sites, buildings, structures and objects of state and local importance"
if they meet at least two tests: That they possess "integrity of location, design, set-
ting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association," and that they either are associ-
ated with significant historic events or persons, or are useful for important information
about the past, or "embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of
construction, or . . . represent the work of a master, or . . . possess high artistic
values, or . . . represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components
may lack individual distinction." Id.
80. Advisory Council Effect Criteria, note 79 supra.
81. The effect would result from the "introduction of visual . . . elements that
are out of character with the property and its setting." 37 Fed. Reg. at 5430. See
note 80 supra and accompanying text. An interstate highway bridge might also in-
troduce incompatible "audible" or "atmospheric" elements. Id.
82. Such a situation has arisen in Charleston, South Carolina, in connection
with a proposed bridge across the James River. The bridge would not itself be built
in a historic district, but it might bring additional traffic through the district, "with
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In all these historic preservation situations where there is am-
biguity as to the "use" of land, the first sentence of section 4(f),
requiring "special effort . . to preserve . . . historic sites," reinforces
section 106 of the 1966 Historic Preservation Act, and serves as a
backstop to the last ("shall not approve . . .") sentence of section
4(f). The requirement of a "special effort" does not depend upon
a finding of "use."
If the site is a property listed in the National Register, section
106 provides a particular method for obtaining authoritative informa-
tion about the relationship between the proposed project and the
site, and an informed judgment as to what is needed in the way of
a special effort. This is important not only because the Advisory
Council's comments under section 106 provide guidance to the Sec-
retary as to what he should do, but also because they can strengthen
his hand against proponents of an unaltered project by virtue of their
status as a recommendation of independent experts.83
the potential for introducing 'visual, audible or atmospheric elements' which too often
qualify as an adverse impact, by any definition." Remarks by Herbert F. De Simmone,
Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Environment and Urban Systems, The
National Trust for Historic Preservation Conference on Legal Techniques in His-
toric Preservation, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1971. A similar question may develop
in connection with traffic generated as a result of the proposed Three Sisters Bridge
project in Washington see note 45 supra. This traffic could have a greater effect
than the bridge itself upon the Georgetown historic district although, unlike the
Charleston historic district, the Georgetown district already has heavy traffic. The
applicability of section 106 in this case depended on a construction of section 23 of
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, P.L. 90-495, § 23, 82 Stat. 827, which pro-
vides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, or any court decision or adminis-
trative action to the contrary, the Secretary . . . shall . . . construct all routes
on the Interstate System within the District of Columbia as set forth in . . .
House Document Numbered 199 [which includes the Three Sisters Bridge] ....
Such construction shall be undertaken as soon as possible . . . and shall be carried
out in accordance with all applicable provisions of title 23 of the United States
Code.
It was not clear whether section 106, which is not part of title 23, was rendered
inapplicable by the phrase "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." Applica-
bility has, however, been confirmed in District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'n v.
Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.) (supplemental opinion and statement on the denial
of a rehearing), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
83. The Presidential appointees to the Advisory Council have included noted
experts in landscape architecture and architectural history. The Advisory Council's
comments may also have some psychological influence upon a cabinet member in that
they represent the views of a body in which other cabinet members nominally sit. The
most important case, for instance, in which the Advisory Council's comments led to the
cancellation of a project concerned a proposed Riverfront Expressway through the
New Orleans Vieux Carr& After reviewing the comments of the Advisory Council,
Secretary Volpe ordered the highway removed from the Interstate system "because the
highway would have seriously impaired the historic quality of New Orleans' famed
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At the same time the Advisory Council's comments under sec-
tion 106 provide the public and the courts with a benchmark against
which to measure the Secretary's "special effort." 4 By establishing
a presumption as to the content of the "special effort" requirement
in a particular case, the Advisory Council's report under section 106
invests the first sentence of section 4(f), which might otherwise be
considered merely hortatory, with a measure of specificity sufficient,
perhaps, to provide a basis for enforcement against the Secretary.
The Secretary is not obliged under section 106 to follow the Advisory
Council's advice. If he disregards the Advisory Council's comments,
however, he may find that he has acquired the burden of persuasion
that he has made a section 4(f) "special effort," whereas in the ab-
sence of such recommendations he might have enjoyed a presumption
as to the regularity of his performance under the statute."5
The section 106 procedure for Advisory Council comments, fur-
thermore, provides public financing and manpower for the staff work
necessary to develop a thorough evaluation of both the consequences
of a proposed undertaking and the feasibility of alternatives. It is
ordinarily difficult for citizens' groups to provide the technical studies
necessary to rebut a government-sponsored project. Under section 106,
however, the resources of the National Park Service staff for the
French Quarter." DOT Press Release 16569 (July 9, 1969). During the DOT study of
the Advisory Council's comments Secretary Volpe received letters from George
Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, May 21, 1969, and from
Russell E. Train, Acting Secretary of the Interior, June 12, 1969, strongly endorsing
the Advisory Council's comments.
84. There has been little judicial reference to the "special effort" clause in the
first sentence of section 4(f). For a rare example of such a reference see Pennsyl-
vania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 620-21 (3d Cir. 1971). In
that case the "special effort" clause of section 2(b) (2) of the DOT Act [49 U.S.C.
§ 1651(b) (2) (1970)], which is identical with the first sentence of section 4(f) [see
text accompanying note 41 supra], was construed to constitute an exception to the
provisions of 23 U.S.C. § 117 (1970), which provides that the Secretary may rely
on a state highway department's certificate of compliance with applicable standards
in the case of the federal-aid secondary system. An unsuccessful attempt to invoke
the "special effort" clause is reported in City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st
Cir. 1972).
85. An analogous shift in the burden of persuasion has been suggested in the
case of noncompliance with the NEPA requirement for a detailed environmental
impact statement [42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970), see note 69 supra]. In Sierra Club
v. Froehlke, 5 ERC 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1973), it was held:
[O]nce a prima facie showing has been made that the federal agency has failed to
adhere to the requirements of NEPA, the burden must, as a general rule, be
laid upon this same agency which has the labor and public resources to make
the proper environmental assessment and support it by a preponderance of the
evidence contained in the impact statement.
Id. at 1062.
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Advisory Council, as well as of the agencies represented on the Ad-
visory Council, and the talents of the individual council members
themselves, 6 can be marshalled in the cause of historic preservation.
With these efforts an analysis can be made which may persuade the
Secretary's staff, or at least key members of his staff, and thereby
assure a favorable presentation to the Secretary within his own de-
partment. At a minimum such a report requires him to focus on a
specific preservation proposal, and on the justification, if any, for
his failure to require that it be adopted.
It may be argued that the situation under the combination of the
first sentence of section 4(f) and section 106 is not different from
the situation under section 106 alone. Such an argument assumes
that the Secretary's duty under section 106 to "take into account
the effect of the undertaking" necessarily includes the duty spelled
out in section 4(f) to make "a special effort . . . to preserve" the
historic site. This assumption has obvious appeal to a lawyer; why
should Congress require an agency head to think about something
unless it wanted him to try to do something about it?
In at least two respects, however, there are practical reasons for
preservationists to welcome the "special effort . . ." language in addi-
tion to the language of section 106. First, non-lawyer administrators
are inclined to draw distinctions which their counsel would not sug-
gest, and to do so without consulting their counsel. Some such high-
way officials might be inclined to brush off their responsibilities with
respect to Advisory Council comments on the theory that to "take
into account . . ." means merely to read, with complete freedom
to reject.8 7 Even to the eye of a non-lawyer, however, "special effort...
86. See notes 78 and 83 supra.
87. Some non-lawyer administrators have tended to interpret the requirement of
"consideration" of specified questions to mean that they may comply by saying that
they have given consideration to such questions, but feel no compulsion to give the
subject significant attention. [See the warning of Congressman Richard D. McCarthy,
note 39 supra]. Congress experienced a similar problem with 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970),
which required, before 1970, that the State highway departments certify to the Sec-
retary that they had held, or offered to hold, hearings on certain highway projects
passing through towns, and had ". . . considered the economic and social effects of
such a location, its impact on the environment, and its consistency with the goals
and objectives of such urban planning as has been promulgated by the community."
The danger of rubber-stamp certifications to such "considerations" led Congress to
amend that section in 1970 by adding the requirement that "[s]uch certification shall
be accompanied by a report which indicates the consideration given to the economic,
social, environmental, and other effects of the plan or highway location or design
and various alternatives which were raised during the hearing or which were other-
wise considered." 23 U.S.C.A. § 128 (Supp. 1973). For further confirmation that the
non-lawyer's approach is not necessarily the lawyer's, see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1971), which upheld the applicability of the requirement in section
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to preserve . . ." clearly requires an effort in a preferred direction
and, coupled with the Advisory Council's comments under section
106, may well require that such effort, absent good reason, support
those Advisory Council comments. In addition, a different kind of
question arises if a recommended preservation effort would cost
more money than the original project. Where, for example, is the
authority to spend highway funds for historic preservation, if the
highway project is to be made more expensive in the interests of
preservation? To "take into account . . ." under section 106 may
imply that one must try to follow the Advisory Council's comments,
all things being equal; it does not clearly authorize the expenditure of
additional highway funds for the purpose. To make "a special ef-
fort . . ." seems to imply more, that at least some extra funds might
be spent, since otherwise the effort would not appear to be very
''special."
The increase-of-traffic situation discussed above assumes that the
affected historic site is on the National Register and that there is
some ambiguity as to the "use" of land from the site. It should be
noted, however, that even if a non-National Register historic site is
involved, at least part of section 4(f) still applies, although section
106 may not. At a minimum the Secretary must make a "special
effort . . . to preserve" the site under the first sentence of section
4(f), and he may, depending on the circumstances, be further con-
strained by the "shall not approve . . ." requirements of the third
106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970) [see note 76
supra and accompanying text] that an agency "take into account the effect of a pro-
posed undertaking" to block grants by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration. The court stated that-
[I]f the LEAA, after following the precepts of NHPA ... , makes a good faith
judgment as to the consequences, courts have no further role to play. We note,
however, that a federal agency obligated to take into account the values
NHPA . . . seek[s] to safeguard may not evade that obligation in keeping its
thought processes under wraps. Discretion to decide does not include a right to
act perfunctorily or arbitrarily. That is the antithesis of discretion. The agency
must not only observe the prescribed procedural requirements and actually take
account of the factors specified, but it must also make a sufficiently detailed dis-
closure so that in the event of a later challenge to the agency's procedure, the
courts will not be left to guess whether the requirements of NHPA . . . have
been obeyed.
Id. at 1138 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has stated, with respect to the
requirements of NEPA that reports on certain projects include detailed statements
as to their environmental impact, ". . . a purely mechanical compliance with tile
particular measures required . . . will not satisfy the Act if they do not amount
to full good faith consideration of the environment." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
1973]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sentence. If, on the other hand, the site is on the National Register,
but there is no ambiguity as to "use," and if the site meets the re-
quirements as to "significance" in the last sentence of section 4(f),
the benefit of the Advisory Council's section 106 comments may
be even more striking in aid of section 4(f)'s "shall not approve..."
provision than its effects when coupled only with the "special ef-
fort . . ." requirement."8
C. The Meaning of the"... Shall Not Approve.. ." Conditions
Four phrases in particular have required attention under the last
sentence of the section (apart from the question, discussed above,
arising from the Statement of the Managers on the part of the House,
as to whether the provision is "mandatory" or "discretionary")
The "no feasible and prudent alternative" phrase; the "all
possible planning to minimize harm" phrase; the "publicly owned"
language;. and the "significance" requirement.
1. Feasible and Prudent Alternative
There has been more concern with the meaning of "feasible" and
"prudent" than with the meaning of "alternative," especially in the
federal-aid highway program. The alternatives likely to be considered
for a highway .by highway planners are alternative locations for the
same road, rather than the alternative of a non-highway form of
transportation,8 9 or the alternative of doing nothing,9" or the alterna-
tive of attempting to reduce traffic by changing the land use plans
88. For a discussion of further interplay between the requirements of section
4(f) and section 106 of NHPA with other legislation applicable to DOT programs
see Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 314, 317-22 (1972).
89. Arlington Coalition v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1337-38 (4th Cir. 1972) (semble)
stated: "From today's vantage point, the economic effects of Arlington 1-66 might be
significantly different than projected in 1958 - rapid rail service might better satisfy
the needs of this area than would 1-66."
90. See District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972) where the court stated: "It is not in-
conceivable for example, that the Secretary might determine that present and fore-
seeable traffic needs can be handled . . . without construction of an additional river
crossing. In that case, an entirely prudent and feasible alternative to the Three Sisters
Bridge might be no bridge at all .... " Secretary Volpe explicity discussed the no-
highway alternative in his consideration of the Lake Allatoona project. [note 189 infra].
In Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1684, 1685 (1972), relating to the discussion of
alternatives required for a NEPA environmental impact statement on a proposed high-
way, the court stated: "the alternatives before the Secretary of Transportation include
not only the various ways of proceeding with the project but also the total abandon-
men of the project."
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on which the projected demand is predicated.9' Such alternatives are
not, however, excluded by the statutory language. In other contexts
Congress has already required that transportation planning cover vari-
ous modes of transport,9" and has recognized that such planning may
have to include restrictions on the use of the private automobile, parti-
cularly in congested urban areas. 93 Congress has, further, directed
that "to the fullest extent possible . . . all agencies of the Federal
Government shall . . . utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences
and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision making
which may have an impact on man's environment."94  If highway
planners are unable to show that there has been such an interdisciplinary
search for non-highway alternatives, or for highway alternatives di-
rected at the reduction of automobile traffic, such as exclusive bus
lanes, and hence the reduction of the need for traffic lanes, they may
be unable to sustain the no-alternative burden which must be met
before protected lands may be used under section 4(f).
Assuming that an alternative is identified for consideration, it must
be demonstrated to be either not "feasible" or not "prudent" before
protected lands may be used. "Feasible" smacks of technical considera-
tions, "prudent" of the entire range of concerns relevant to wisdom.
91. A somewhat analogous issue can arise when an agency is required to make a
detailed environmental impact statement describing the consequences of a proposed
action, under section 102(2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970). That
section requires a discussion of alternatives to the proposed action. It has been held
that in some circumstances the discussion of alternatives must include consideration
of "reasonably available" alternatives outside the jurisdiction of the agency proposing
the action and making the statement. National Resources Defense Council v. Mor-
ton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). It may be, however, that such alternatives re-
quire discussion for purposes of NEPA without being deemed to exist for purposes
of section 4(f).
92. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 § 12(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1712(b)
(1970).
93. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970) requires
the states to adopt plans for the "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of
certain air quality standards within three years after the approval of the standards.
It also provides for federal approval of these implementation plans if the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency determines, inter alia, that they in-
clude "such ... measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance
of such . . . standard, including, but not limited to, land-use and transportation
controls . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 185 7c-5(a) (2) (B) (1970). Such land-use and trans-
portation controls were considered necessary because of the effect of pollution
emissions from automobiles on air quality, particularly in congested areas. See Clean
Air Act §§ 101(a) (2), 202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a) (2), 1857f-1 (1970); 116 CONG.
REc. S20600, S20609 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie during the Senate debate
on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and exhibit 1 attached thereto).
94. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2) (A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2) (A) (1970).
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Since both words appear it is not necessary to refine "feasible" beyond
the general concept of capability of being built, or of being made to
work, with available technology.9 5 Nuances as to other factors which
might tend to make an engineering project inadvisable, such as ex-
cessive cost, need not be addressed as questions of feasibility, since
they can be considered under the requirement of prudence.
"Prudent" means more, apparently, than merely wise. The Su-
preme Court undertook an exegesis in March 1971, in Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe." The Court unanimously rejected de-
fendants' contention "that the requirement that there be no other
'prudent' route requires the Secretary to engage in a wide-ranging
balancing of competing interests ... [and that] the Secretary should
weigh the detriment resulting from the destruction of parkland against
the cost of other routes, safety considerations, and other factors, and
determine on the basis of the importance that he attaches to these
95. "[T]he requirement that there be no 'feasible' alternative route admits of
little administrative discretion. For this exemption to apply the Secretary must find
that as a matter of sound engineering it would not be feasible to build the highway
along any other route." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 411 (1971).
96. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The Court summarized the background of the case
as follows:
Overton Park is a 342-acre city park located near the center of Memphis. The
park contains a zoo, a nine-hole municipal golf course, an outdoor theatre,
nature trails, a bridle path, an art academy, picnic areas, and 170 acres of forest.
The proposed highway, which is to be six-lane, highspeed, expressway, will sever
the zoo from the rest of the park. Although the roadway will be depressed below
ground level except where it crosses a small creek, 26 acres of the park will be
destroyed. The highway is to be a segment of Interstate Highway 1-40, part
of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. 1-40 will provide
Memphis with a major east-west expressway which will allow easier access to
downtown Memphis from the residential areas on the eastern edge of the city.
Although the route through the park was approved by the Bureau of Public
Roads in 1956 and by the Federal Highway Administrator in 1966, the enact-
ment of § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act prevented distribution
of federal funds for the section of the highway designated to go through Overton
Park until the Secretary of Transportation determined whether the require-
ments of § 4(f) had been met. Federal funding for the rest of the project was,
however, available; and the state acquired a right-of-way on both sides of the
park. In April 1968, the Secretary [Alan S. Boyd] announced that he concurred
in the judgment of local officials that 1-40 should be built through the park. And
in September 1969 the State acquired the right-of-way inside Overton Park
from the city. Final approval for the project - the route as well as the design -
was not announced until November 1969 . . . . Neither announcement approving
the route and design of 1-40 was accompanied by a statement of the Secretary's
factual findings. He did not indicate why he believed there were no feasible
and prudent alternative routes or why design changes could not be made to
reduce the harm to the park.
Id. at 406-408.
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other factors whether, on balance, alternative feasible routes would
be 'prudent'. '97 Justice Marshall observed that it is always cheaper
and less disruptive to build through parks than through privately owned,
occupied land. Since these factors "are common to substantially all
highway construction . . . . if Congress intended these factors to be
on an equal footing with preservation of parkland there would have
been no need for the statutes." Cost and community disruption are
not to be "ignored," but "the very existence of the statute indicates
that parkland was to be given paramount importance." Parkland,
and presumably the other categories of land which are accorded the
same protection under section 4(f), "were not to be lost unless there
were truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost
of community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached
extraordinary magnitudes . . . . [T]he Secretary cannot approve the
destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present
unique problems."98
This formulation came as a pleasant surprise to the friends of
parkland in DOT. The stauchest environmentalists in the Office of
the Secretary had not gone quite this far before the Supreme Court
spoke. They too had argued that parkland should not be considered
on a parity with non-environmental considerations, but should be
favored. They had based these arguments partially on the same reason-
ing as the Court's (that is, why else the statute?), and partially
on the requirement in section 2 (b) (2) and in the first sentence of
section 4(f) for a "special effort to preserve . . . parks." They had
not, however, asserted that parkland could never be used unless al-
ternatives presented "unique problems," or that the cost or disrup-
tion of alternatives must first reach "extraordinary magnitudes."
Their restraint was based in part on conceptual difficulties with the
case of the insignificant taking from a significant park (discussed be-
low under "The 'Significance' Requirement"). Meanwhile, as noted
above,99 other advisors to the Secretary, particularly from FHWA,
had been arguing for an even weaker interpretation. This position
was based on the "discretionary" concept in the House Managers'
97. Id. at 411.
98. Id. at 412, 413 (emphasis added). When the issue was ultimately remanded
to Secretary Volpe for new determinations under the criteria, he decided that the
project "cannot be approved." Secretarial Decision on 1-40, Overton Park, Memphis,
Tennessee, Jan. 18, 1973. For a court of appeals paraphrase of the Overton Park
test, see Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1886, 1889-90 (2d
Cir. 1972) where the court stated: "In other words, a road must not take parkland,
unless a prudent person, concerned with the quality of the human environment, is
convinced that there is no way to avoid doing so."
99. Note 37 supra.
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Statement on the 1968 Conference Report and on other Congressional
materials which came primarily but not entirely from the House
Public Works Committee. These materials indicated that the pro-
tection of parklands should be subject to "balancing" with other social
objectives, particularly the minimization of housing condemnations.
The net result, it is probably fair to conclude, is that before March
1971 neither Secretary Alan S. Boyd nor Secretary John A. Volpe
ever made a section 4(f) determination - that "there is no feasible
and prudent alternative" to the use of parks or other protected land -
with the understanding that the phrase means what the Supreme
Court said it means in Overton Park.100
If costs are to be considered to some degree, two further prob-
lems arise: first, the criteria by which costs should be judged ac-
ceptable or excessive; and second, the extent to which the judgments
100. Several courts have indicated that the Supreme Court's explanation of
"feasible and prudent alternative" in Overton Park came as a surprise. In the re-
mand of that case for further findings, for instance, the district court stated:
[E]ven if it could be said that Secretary Volpe made a determination that
there was no 'feasible and prudent' alternative to the park route, it is clear
that he did not give these words the interpretation that the Supreme Court did
and that therefore he did not apply the correct legal standard ....
In this connection, it should . . . be pointed out that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 4(f) is contrary to what the Department of Transportation
and its Secretary must have expected it to be ...
[T]he Court has by its interpretation narrowly limited the choices of the
Secretary. In doing so . . . the Court gave no effect to the proviso in § 4(f)
having to do with decisions by local officials. . . . [Tihe Secretary's position in
this court when this case was first before us and his position in the Supreme
Court was that he was indeed entitled, under § 4(f), to balance the detriment
to the park against the disadvantages of a route that would avoid the park.
There is nothing in the administrative record to indicate that anyone in the
Department of Transportation in 1969 had any notion that § 4(f) so narrowly
constricted the Secretary's options. The record is clear that Secretary Boyd,
when he approved the park route in April, 1968, gave very great weight to the
fact that the route had been approved by the City Council of Memphis, which,
in the light of the wording of § 4(f) and the legislative history, is certainly
understandable, but as we have seen, no weight may be given to the fact of
approval by local officials.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 879-80 (W.D.
Tenn. 1972). While this may reflect a certain defensiveness there have been other
opinions indicating that the Supreme Court's interpretation in Overton Park consti-
tuted a significant change. In Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruin. Envir. v. Volpe,
330 F. Supp. 918, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1971), a remand was ordered because Overton
Park was treated as an "intervening [change] . . . in the law after an administrative
decision [had] . . . been made but before final decision by the District Court."
Similarly, in San Antonio, the Fifth Circuit treated Overton Park as a "changed con-
dition" warranting reconsideration of an earlier decision adverse to plaintiffs, despite
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari [400 U.S. 968 (1970)] in the earlier action.
446 F.2d at 1020.
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should be considered matters of adminstrative expertise, to which the
courts should defer, as distinguished from policy choices in a realm
in which judges may decide for themselves. These problems also
apply to the analysis of "all possible planning to minimize harm"
and of the limits of judicial review, and are discussed below under
those headings.
2. All Possible Planning To Minimize Harm
While the "no feasible and prudent alternative" test refers to
highway location - whether to use parkland or not - the "all possi-
ble planning" test refers to design. It has, furthermore, always been
understood to mean actual design - not merely the planning process
but its implementation as well. Before Overton Park it was assumed
in DOT that "all possible" is a stiffer requirement than "feasible and
prudent," but that, on the other hand, "possible" does not mean
"possible." The conventional approach in FHWA has been that
anything is "possible" for engineering, at some cost, but that Congress
did not require that parkland be saved if the only alternative is "by
way of the moon." Therefore, "possible" came to mean, in FHWA,
that the alternative must be acceptable to state and local authorities,
and that its costs not be excessive. There were no formal guidelines
as to acceptable costs. Ordinarily in practice an increase not greater
than ten percent of the total cost of a project would appear "possible."
Planning to minimize harm would encounter resistance in FHWA
if it added more than ten percent to the cost of a project, especially
if such increase were opposed by the state highway department.
The amounts which FHWA would ordinarily be willing to spend
for minimizing harm under the "all possible planning" concept were
limited not only by the small percentage limit on cost increases,
but even more by the artificially small base against which the per-
centage was applied, that is, the "project." A "project" is the limited
amount of work which appears appropriate on a case by case basis
to be let under a single construction contract. Therefore, a single
bridge, or a bridge and its approaches, might be a "project," as
might a small stretch of road of a mile or two or five. The relevant
base is often greater. The "project" may be one of many similar
projects designed to connect two points or to cross a city. If, in
determining whether a proposal for minimizing harm is "possible,"
it is proper to include an evaluation of whether its cost is so excessive
as to render it not "possible," the evaluation should be in relation to
the cost of the overall relevant undertaking, and not merely the cost
of the limited "project."
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In the Overton Park case, for instance, there were unresolved
issues concerning the design of the proposed interstate highway, as
well as fundamental questions as to its location.'' As designed by
the Tennessee Highway Department, the road was to be depressed
through part of the park, but was to rise so as to pass over a stream,
Lick Creek, which crosses the suggested route near the entrance to
the municipal zoo. If the road was to go through the park, the citizens'
groups would have liked to have had it buried in a tunnel, so as to
be completely invisible. As a less acceptable alternative, the preserva-
tionists would have preferred that the road be depressed throughout
its length to a depth greater than the height of any vehicles, and parti-
ally covered with platform lids so as to preserve continuity of visibility
across the surface of the park.0 2
The grounds on which these suggestions were opposed illustrate
the ambiguities as to criteria in FHWA's administration of section
4(f), and the difficulties in separating issues to which the agency's
specialized expertise may be relevant from policy choices which should
be approached by non-technical administrators and courts from the
viewpoint of statutory construction rather than civil engineering. The
grounds for the opposition were:
a. That the project does not damage the park, or that the proposed
changes would not be beneficial to the park, and therefore would not
"minimize harm."'10 3  This raises the question of who is to judge
park values. The Department of the Interior strongly supported the
design changes which were proposed by the conservationists and op-
posed, in the Nixon Administration, by FHWA.'" If courts are
101. The discussion herein on the factual aspects of the Overton Park contro-
versy is based on "the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the
time he made his decision." 401 U.S. at 419. This "administrative record" comprised
the documents which had been generated in the Department of Transportation in
connection with its consideration of the Overton Park project. The Supreme Court
required that this administrative record be considered by the district court on remand
of the proceedings, in order to establish whether the Secretary of Transportation
had made a proper determination under section 4(f). Id. This Record is on file
in the office of the Maryland Law Review and was made available to me by counsel
for plaintiffs, John W. Vardaman, Jr., Esq., who is, of course, not responsible for
any of my views.
102. 401 U.S. at 408 n.18.
103. Administrative Record, Memorandum from F.C. Turner, Federal Highway
Administrator, to John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, Aug. 18, 1969. The
Memorandum stated that "every effort is now being made to minimize the damage,
if indeed it is 'damage,' to the park." Id. at 2.
104. Administrative Record, Letter from Walter J. Hickel, Secretary of the In-
terior, to John A. VolDe. Secretary of Transportation, July 18, 1969. Some of the
design changes sought by the plaintiffs had been proposed by DOT under the Johnson
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to defer to administrative expertise, the only agency which should
merit such deference is an agency which has institutional competence
on the matters at issue. When the parkland benefits or damages in
question are matters of civil engineering, perhaps FHWA has such
competence. Usually, however, the issues relate primarily to parkland
aesthetics. If the question is whether a six-lane interstate superhigh-
way at the gate of the zoo would provide audible and visual intrusions
incompatible with the setting and whether accordingly it would mini-
mize harm to the park for the highway not to be so visible and
audible, 10 5 there is no reason to defer to FHWA's expertise. FHWA
may be thought to have special competence on the question of whether
the alternative design can be built, but not on the question of whether
it would help the park.'
Administration. Administrative Record, Certificate of Alan S. Boyd, former Secre-
tary of Transportation, Jan. 8, 1971, and letter from J.D. Braman, Assistant Secre-
tary of Transportation, to Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Aug. 28, 1969.
105. FHWA assumed that the Overton Park interstate project would have mini-
mal effect on park values. For instance, the Turner Memorandum, supra note 103,
argued that "[t]he small, severed strip along the north side is already severed to
some degree by the existing bus roadway. Thus the area has little use .... Turner
Memorandum, supra note 103, at 3.
106. An analogous situation has been adjudicated. At issue was a Corps of Engi-
neers project in which the Corps disagreed with the Fish and Wildlife Service of
the Department of the Interior as to the impact of the project on fisheries, and with
the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation of the Department of the Interior as to the recrea-
tional benefits of the project. The court stated:
Congress did not intend that a federal agency consult with another agency
'which has . . . special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved' and then have its comments . . . ignored .... With all due respect to the
experts acquired by the Corps of Engineers to work in the environmental sec-
tions . . ., their duties cannot include their substitution for the expertise of
other federal agencies charged with primary duties relating to the environ-
ment. . . . When a conflict arises between the Corps and an agency which is
making an evaluation in its particular field of expertise, and when the Corps'
evaluation is based upon factors of which the reviewing agency may take cogni-
zance, then NEPA obligates the Corps in most instances to defer to that evalua-
tion. Only upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence that the re-
viewing agency was incorrect in its assessment should the Corps adopt another
evaluation; even so, this refusal to defer should not occur until after the review-
ing agency has had the opportunity to review the Corps' claimed evidence, and
possibly reverse or modify its original evaluation.
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 ERC 1033, 1072 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
A similar problem can arise over the threshold question whether the land
to be used for a transportation project is protected under section 4(f). If, for in-
stance, a highway is proposed to be routed through a public boat marina, there
might be a difference of opinion between FHWA and the Bureau of Outdoor Recrea-
tion as to whether such a facility is a "recreation area." Presumably the Bureau
would claim expertise as to "recreation."
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b. That the proposed changes would be too costly.1"7 The lower
courts emphasized the Government's allegations that a bored tunnel
would cost about $107 million and a cut and cover tunnel would
cost $41.5 million, as compared with $3.5 million for the design
proposed by the State Highway Department and approved by
FHWA.'05 As of the time of the Supreme Court's opinion, however,
there had been essentially no discussion of two critical cost issues:
first, the cost of the third alternative, under which the road would
have been depressed throughout the park, with discontinuous plat-
form lids ;"o9 and second, why any of these costs would make a more
protective design not "possible" for purposes of section 4(f).
The Government relied on this difference in cost, between $107
million and $41.5 million for tunnels and the $3.5 million for the
proposed design, as being determinative on its face. The Govern-
ment's argument was apparently intended to imply that an extra
107. "It would, of course, be engineeringly possible to construct such a tunnel,
but it would not be reasonably productive of benefits equal to the cost nor would
it be a reasonably prudent expenditure of public funds for the changes brought about
in the park itself." Turner Memorandum, s'upra note 103, at 1. "This concept was
considered as not being reasonably productive of benefits equal to the cost nor a
prudent expenditure of public funds." FHWA Report, at 1, forwarded on October 14,
1969, its date of publication, to Secretary Volpe by Administrator Turner's office. This
emphasis by FHWA engineers on non-statutory subjective criteria, instead of the
section 4(f) requirement for "all possible planning to minimize harm," permeates
the entire Administrative Record.
It is particularly interesting to note in this connection, that in 1973, after
three years of litigation in which the Government consistently dismissed the con-
cept of tunnelling, Secretary Volpe finally decided, on remand: "Apart from alterna-
tive locations, I am also convinced that a tunnel design would be less harmful to
the park than the present design." Secretarial Decision on 1-40, supra note 98.
108. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D.
Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970). Later, in its presentations to Secretary
Volpe, FHWA adopted a more limited concept of the relevant "proposal," by ex-
cluding the cost of work at the ends of the project, so that the base cost of the pro-
posal, for purposes of comparison with the costs of design improvements, became
$1.1 million rather than $3.5 million. Administrative Record, Report by FHWA
Office of Right-of-Way and Location, Oct. 14, 1969 [hereinafter cited as FHWA
Report]. While this may have been intended to focus on the specific stretch of road
which would have been affected by the alternate design proposals, its effect was to
make the ratio between the proposed cost of the project and the estimated cost of
design improvements even more unfavorable to plaintiffs. See note 67 supra for other
examples of manipulation of the scope of a "project," and expressions of judicial dis-
approval thereof.
109. The Administrative Record which was made available after the Supreme
Court opinion contains FHWA materials which indicate that a fully depressed line
without cover would cost between three and six million dollars extra, depending
on the need for and costs of making the section "waterproof and non-buoyant in
the area of the Lick Creek Siphon." Administrative Record, FHWA Report on
1-40, encl. 3, Oct. 23, 1969.
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cost for parkland protection makes such protection not "possible"
for one or both of two reasons: that in absolute terms an extra
cost of $36 million or more is necessarily too much; or that, compara-
tively, the extra cost is thirty times, or eleven times, as much as
the cost of the basic project without such additional protection, and
that such a ratio is necessarily excessive.
It is not clear, however, that an increment viewed in either light
should amount to a self-evident condition of "impossibility" for pur-
poses of section 4(f) without further analysis as to why the design,
even at the incremental cost, is not "possible." Even if an inference
of such impossibility would be proper in some case, the record in
Overton Park, at the time of the remand by the Supreme Court, did
not establish the context in which such an unreasoned disqualification
of design improvements would be plausible on grounds of cost alone.
One defect was in the concept of the relevant base for comparison.
The $3.5 million for the proposed project was not the cost of 1-40,
or even the cost of bringing 1-40 through Memphis; it was merely
the cost of the limited "project" to be contracted. Interstate high-
ways cost in the order of $1- to $2 million per mile in open country,
and in the order of $15 million to $20 million per mile, sometimes
more, in urban areas."' 1-40 therefore represents an investment
of billions of dollars from North Carolina to California."' The rela-
tively minor portion of its costs in Memphis alone will probably
amount to about $60 million to $80 million." 2  Frequently, there are
two or more interstate freeways in a metropolitan area. The total
cost of Interstate highways in a city may well be in the upper nine
figure range ;i3 four interstate highways in the Memphis metropolitan
area may amount to about $300 million."' The question whether
110. Conversations with Mr. Rex I. Wells, FHWA Office of Right-of-Way and
Location, who later became Chief, Environmental Development Division. Mr. Wells
has no responsibility for any of my views.
111. Interstate 40 is to stretch "about 2,348 miles." DOT Press Release 24069
(Nov. 5, 1969).
112. See note 110 supra.
113. The proposed east-west Interstate system through Baltimore, for instance,
is estimated to cost in the order of a billion dollars for 22 miles of urban highways.
Statement of Mayor William D. Schaefer, Hearings on Proposed 1972 Highway
Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 727 (1972). The Baltimore proposals, however, may also in-
volve certain section 4(f) difficulties, and were described by Secretary of Trans-
portation John A. Volpe on May 10, 1972 as among "projects that just may never
be built, because of the tremendous . . . environmental and human and social
damage that would be done .... [P1rojects where I doubt seriously we are going to
resolve these problems." Id. at 155-56.
114. See note 110 supra.
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any given amount is so outlandish an expenditure for parkland pro-
tection as to be not "possible" would appear to require a comparison
of the total amount suggested for extraordinary amenity protection
in the metropolitan region with the total amount to be spent for
interstate highways in that region. For example, in a city where the
total cost of interstate highways amounts to $300 million or more
and where a prime park is involved, an additional expenditure of $60
million for tunnelling may not be so excessive as to be not "possible."
Furthermore, an additional cost of three to six million dollars for a
totally depressed road (the third alternative) might be absurdly
small even in comparison to the cost of 1-40 in Memphis. For all the
record shows, however, the third alternative might be feasible at
such a cost."' The practice of state highway departments, however,
has been to disqualify such an amenity investment as not "possible"
since it amounts to eighty-five percent extra on the "project," dis-
regarding the percentage of incremental investment in a broader and
more relevant context. Such practice is generally supported by FHWA.
Since interstate projects are expensive, and since FHWA pays only
ninety percent, the remaining ten percent to be borne by the state
can loom large for a state highway department. Depending on the
politics of the area, the highway department might prefer to spend
$300,000 in widening and resurfacing three miles of a rural route than
for the state's ten percent share of a $3 million Interstate design
improvement in order to preserve an urban park. Whatever the merits
of such a preference, the legal issue under section 4(f) is whether the
planning to minimize harm to a protected park is "possible," not
whether the planning is preferable in view of a state highway depart-
ment or FHWA." It is therefore important, if costs are to be given
any weight, that courts carefully scrutinize the relationships between
the projected costs for design improvement and the costs of a reason-
115. See notes 109 supra and 119 infra.
116. The use by DOT of criteria other than those specified in section 4(f) has
been severely criticized, particularly with respect to the requirement that there be
no "feasible and prudent" alternative to the route. See Arlington Coalition on
Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Fugate v. Arlington Coali-
tion on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000 (1972), which concerned the illegality of the use of
parkland for highway purposes based on the preferences of federal or state officials
formed on criteria other than whether feasible and prudent alternatives exist. See also
District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972) which concerned the impropriety of permitting the
"extraneous pressure" of a congressman, who had threatened to "do everything that
he could to withhold Congressional appropriations for the District of Columbia
rapid transit system" unless the Secretary approved plans for the Three Sisters
Bridge, to "intrude into the calculus of consideration upon which the Secretary's
decision was based." Id. at 1245-46.
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ably comprehensively defined overall highway undertaking of which the
"project" is a part. Otherwise there is a serious danger that necessary
design planning will be eliminated on improper grounds, such as on
state highway department and FHWA decisions that are based upon
agency judgments of how much they are willing to spend for parkland
protection, notwithstanding Congress' directives in section 4(f)."I
c. That the alternative designs are objectionable from an engi-
neering point of view. FHWA contended, for instance, that the pro-
posed design, involving an elevated crossing of Lick Creek, ". . . has
been depressed as much as is reasonably possible."' The problem lies
in the meaning of the phrase "reasonably possible." If it means tech-
nically feasible, the reluctance of a court to adjudicate the issue would
be understandable. Opponents of the proposed design contend, how-
ever, that there is no factual issue as to the feasibility of a more
depressed design. Rather, they assert, FHWA would have to agree,
if pressed, that a more depressed road could be built, at a cost."'
FHWA, it is argued, dismissed the alternative design as not "reason-
117. The same kind of judicial attention to cost relationships which is suggested
here in connection with design questions may also be needed in connection with
location questions [discussed in the text at part III Cl supral if the agency has relied
on the costs of alternatives to justify the contention that alternatives are not "feasible
and prudent." In both cases, of course, the cost of the design improvement should be
compared with the value of the park benefits it may bring, as well as with alternative
construction costs.
118. Administrative Record, Memorandum from F.C. Turner, FHWA Adminis-
trator, to John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, Aug. 18, 1969. Two months
later FHWA concluded that it "is possible to lower the profile by as much as four
feet at one particular place and to generally lower it about two feet .... " Adminis-
trative Record, Memorandum from Acting FHWA Administrator Holmes to John
A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, Oct. 23, 1969.
119. FHWA has, indeed, estimated the cost of such construction at various times.
See, e.g., Administrative Record, Memorandum from Acting Chief, Environmental
Programs Division (OST) to Assistant Secretary for Environment and Urban Sys-
tems, Aug. 11, 1969, referring to a conversation of April 22, 1969 with two responsi-
ble FHWA engineers, D.W. Loutzenheiser and T.G. Hasemeier, who said "there
would be engineering difficulties in depressing the road at Lick Creek, but that it
could be done at a price." They estimated that the price could be two to four million
dollars more than the cost of not depressing it, "depending on the difficulties which
were encountered." There were also estimates for a fully depressed road without
covers, in FHWA Report on 1-40, encl. 3, Oct. 23, 1969, note 109 supra, and Affi-
davit of John A. Volpe, July 15, 1971 which stated: ". . . I was informed that, in
order to depress the highway below Lick Creek, an inverted siphon would have to
be installed together with mechanical pumping equipment for the removal of high-
way drainage. These requirements would more than double the cost of this highway
section" (emphasis added). The amount which would be more than doubled is not
specified; but apparently the base in question is only about a million dollars. This
figure which was adopted in the FHWA administrative analyses, represents the cost
of the "section," a smaller stretch than the "project." See note 107 supra.
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ably possible" because it did not regard the cost which would be
necessary to solve engineering problems as reasonable, and not because
the engineering problems were in any way unsolvable. In the absence
of a clear articulation of the criteria by which this judgment was made,
it is difficult to determine whether FHWA's concept of the "reasonably
possible" accords with section 4(f)'s requirements for "all possible
planning to minimize harm." Without careful inquiry it is impossible
to know whether the objection is really based on engineering grounds
or on administrative choices as to the amount which should be spent
for purposes of section 4(f).12° If, for instance, a fully depressed road
120. Certain specific technical problems in connection with a fully depressed
route are identifiable in the opinions and Administrative Record. It is, however,
nowhere stated by FHWA that these problems appear unsolvable at a predictable
price. Instead, the record suggests that the engineering objections were not originally
FHWA objections, but rather objections of the city of Memphis. See Administrative
Record, Memorandum from F.C. Turner, FHWA Administrator, to John A. Volpe,
Secretary of Transportation, Aug. 18, 1969 which states:
While this concept [referring to the environmentalists' suggestion that the road
be completely depressed] is possible, the city is adamantly opposed. Should the
drainage be pumped, the city's concern is with possible power failure, which has
already occurred at a similar installation elsewhere in Memphis. They are also
opposed to an inverted siphon because of its many unusual maintenance prob-
lems, together with its hazard to human and animal life, and of possible health
hazard and nuisance due to stagnant water.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). It later developed that "[i]t is Tennessee policy that the
State Highway Department maintains and operates all Interstate highways, includ-
ing urban sections. Operations for drainage of depressed section would be a state
and not city responsibility." Administrative Record, Memorandum from Acting
FHWA Administrator Holmes to John A. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, encl. 1,
Oct. 23, 1969. Ultimately Secretary Volpe discussed these problems as if they were his
own concerns, rather than the city's, but was not at all clear whether he was asserting
engineering objections which could reasonably justify the contention that such objec-
tions rendered the proposed design improvements not "possible." "[Plower failures -
during severe storms, for example - would render the pumps inoperable and cause
dangerous flooding . . . . [A]n inverted siphon would create unusual maintenance
problems, and would be a possible health hazard and nuisance because of stagnant
water . Administrative Record, Affidavit of John A. Volpe, July 15, 1971 (em-
phasis added). This affidavit was prepared in response to the Supreme Court's determi-
nation in Overton Park that previous affidavits prepared in connection with the litiga-
tion were "merely 'post hoc' rationalizations . . . which have traditionally been found
to be an inadequate basis for review." 401 U.S. at 419. It does not, however, squarely
address the question whether engineering remedies could be provided - for example,
whether emergency motor-generator units could provide stand-by power for the drain-
age pumps in event of power failure, and, if so, at what cost; whether the "unusual"
maintenance problems would be unthinkably expensive, or merely "unusual" but inex-
pensive, such as periodic inspections and waste removal; or whether, similarly, the
"possible" health hazards and nuisance could be avoided by a relatively simple, albeit
"unusual" maintenance program. The record is consistent with either the proposition
that a serious engineering decision, appropriate to a finding of "not possible," was made
by FHWA and the Secretary, or the proposition that it was not, in that the record is
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could be built for an extra expenditure of $3 to $6 million dollars and
if the total cost of bringing 140 across Memphis were $60 million,
the question whether the alternative design constitutes an element of
"all possible planning to minimize harm to the park" becomes a matter
of statutory construction. Such consideration must take into account the
views of parkland experts as to value of such planning to the park,
and not FHWA's engineering expertise as to what is "reasonably
possible." ''
devoid of specific attention to the basis for the conclusions put forward by defendants.
Nevertheless, on remand the district court determined that:
[Tihe Secretary could have reasonably believed that the design he approved consti-
tuted all that was reasonably possible to minimize harm to the park and that, basing
his decision on the relevant factors and weighing them in the light of the require-
ment that all reasonably possible be done to protect the park, his decision that the
design met this test was not arbitrary or capricious or a clear error of judgment.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 883 (W.D. Tenn.
1972) (emphasis added). On such reasoning the mere assertion of a possible objection
related to engineering considerations would essentially immunize FHWA from judicial
review of any determinations concerning the "all possible planning" requirement of
section 4(f), since the court assumes that the term "reasonably possible" is so clear
that the agency can be trusted to apply such a standard without searching inquiry by
the court as to what the agency thinks the formula means.
121. The dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Celebrezze concerning the Overton
Park factual issues stated:
[P]ublic parklands are the only remaining weekend sanctuaries for vast num-
bers of city dwellers from the polluted urban sprawl. A threat to a neighborhood
parkland is a threat to the health, happiness, and peace of mind of all the neighbor-
hood people. Congress recognized this fact . ... Obviously, the federal courts do
not have the technical expertise of roadbuilders, and they should never interfere in
the technical processes of building roads. It is our solemn responsibility, however,
to insure that those with technical expertise exercise it in accordance with the laws
of the United States and the public welfare."
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1318 (6th Cir. 1970).
For an interesting parallel in British administrative law, see Padfield v. Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 997, particularly Lord Upjohn's opinion at
1060 concerning the Minister's discretion under an Act that required certain steps "if
the Minister 'in any case so directs" [Id. at 717] or "if hethinks fit to do so." Id. The
opinion considered whether -that discretion was, as the defendants asserted, "unfettered."
After noting that such an adjective did not appear in the statute he commented:
Secondly, even if the section did contain that adjective I doubt if it would make
any difference in law to his powers, save to emphasize what he has already,
namely that acting lawfully he has a power of decision which cannot be con-
trolled by the courts; it is unfettered. But the use of that adjective, even in
an Act of Parliament, can do nothing to unfetter the control which the judiciary
have over the executive, namely that in exercising their powers the latter must
act lawfully and that it is a matter to be determined by looking at the Act and
its scope and object in conferring a discretion upon a minister rather than by
the use of adjectives.
Id. at 719. For recent American discussions of the need for judicial control over
agency discretion, see Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informnal Discretionary Adjudica-
tion and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1972); Wright, Book Review, 81
YALE L.J. 575 (1972), and references cited therein.
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3. "Publicly Owned"
Public parks, recreation areas and wildlife and waterfowl re-
serves, but not historic sites, must be "publicly owned" before the
requirements of the last sentence of section 4(f) (". . . the Secretary
shall not approve the use of any land.. .") apply. Questions can arise
about such lands which are owned by non-profit public interest organi-
zations, as for instance Audubon Society bird sanctuaries, or park-like
scenic areas owned by the Nature Conservancy and open to the public.
In 1968, draft regulations were prepared in the DOT General
Counsel's Office for the implementation of section 4(f). Those drafts
would have defined "publicly owned" lands to include lands owned by
non-profit organizations and dedicated to uses on behalf of the public.122
The regulations were never issued, for reasons which had nothing to do
with this interpretation. 23
Whether or not DOT would interpret "publicly owned" the same
way in the future, the lands in question would qualify for some pro-
tection, if only under the first sentence of section 4(f). The Secretary
would presumably be obliged under that sentence to make "a special
effort" to save Audubon Society and Nature Conservancy lands from
federal-aid highway encroachment, even if they were not considered
"publicly owned." In such case a question could arise whether his
discretion is as limited under the "special effort" clause as it is, in
the case of "publicly owned" lands, where he is governed by the last
sentence of section 4(f) as construed in Overton Park. The statutory
language appears less rigorous in the former case than the latter. Yet
it may be difficult for the Secretary to show even a "special effort"
unless he can demonstrate some consideration of the factors applicable
to the use of "publicly owned" land, that is, the feasibility and prudence
of alternatives and the sufficiency of the planning to minimize harm.
If he attempts such consideration he will confront the same analytic
challenge which the Court faced in Overton Park. Whether parkland is
publicly owned or not, it will almost always be cheaper and less
disruptive socially to use it than to use developed land outside the
park. If the Congressional directive has any purpose, it must be to
attach a weighted preference to the favored values specified for pro-
tection, and not merely to treat cost and disruption ". . . on an equal
footing with preservation of parkland ... ,,24 Therefore, it would
122. See note 48 supra.
123. See text following note 52 supra.
124. 401 U.S. at 412. The quantum of preference which must be accorded pro-
tected lands may theoretically be smaller under "the special effort" requirement in
the first sentence of section 4(f), than under the Overton Park criteria for establish-
ing the absence of "feasible and prudent" alternatives under the third sentence. The
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appear that something like "paramount importance" must be given
to non-publicly owned protected lands as well as to those which are
publicly owned, if the "special effort" requirement of the first sentence
of section 4(f) is to be satisfied. If this is the case, the Secretary may
as well treat Audubon Society and Nature Conservancy lands in
general as "publicly owned," and refuse to support state highway de-
partment projects involving their use, except in circumstances essentially
similar to those in which such use could be justified under the Overton
Park tests.
4. "The Significance Requirement"
All categories of land protected by the last sentence of section
4(f) - historic sites as well as public parks, recreation areas and
wildlife and waterfowl refuges - must be "of national, State, or local
significance as determined by the federal, State, or local officials having
jurisdiction thereof." Again, as in the case of the "publicly owned"
condition, this qualification does not apply to the "... special effort...
requirement in the first sentence of the section.
When this provision was enacted as part of the 1968 amendments
to Section 4(f), it was at first feared by some conservationists that it
tended to undermine section 4(f) by assigning to local authorities the
discretion whether to apply the protection of section 4(f). These fears
were stimulated by the misleading explanations in the Statement of
the House Managers." 5
The gloom was not justified. The section does not leave to local,
or to any other officials, discretion as to whether eligible lands should
be protected. It deals solely with the identification of the eligible lands,
and is useful in proportion to the strength with which the rest of the
provision is interpreted.
The tougher the prohibitions against the use of protected lands,
the greater is the need for a mechanism fer excluding environmentally
useless lands from the coverage of the prohibition. There are many
cases of such useless lands. They would include small islands and strips
of abandoned or forfeited property which are under the jurisdiction
of local park authorities for maintenance purposes but which have no
scenic or recreational importance, and obsolete recreation property in
areas of changing land use which are no longer near residential areas.
If the costs and disruptions of alternative routes around such worth-
less land were required to be "truly unusual" and of "extraordinary
practical effect of any such difference, however, is conjectural given the imprecision
with which such values are subject to quantification.
125. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
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magnitudes" to meet the Overton Park tests, section 4(f) would be
quickly discredited in the minds of an outraged public. It would make
no sense to condemn good housing in order to avoid a route through
an open space eyesore if the land is neither needed nor suitable for
park or recreational development.
There might have been a serious problem in the protection of
valuable lands if the significance requirement had been interpreted as
a condition precedent, requiring formal determinations of significance
as a prerequisite to the application of section 4(f). Fortunately, no
such triggering has been demanded, at least with respect to protected
lands other than historic sites. Significance is assumed to have been
determined by local or other officials who provide funds for the main-
tenance of publicly owned parks, recreation areas and wildlife or water-
fowl refuges, on the reasonable inference that otherwise they would not
spend public funds on the lands." 6 Formal determinations are accord-
ingly used in section 4(f) practice to verify that an example of one
of these categories of land is not "significant," rather than to establish
that it is significant.'2 7 While city councils are willing to resolve that
126. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1336 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000 (1972),
where the court stated: ". . . land used as a public park is presumed 'significant'
unless explicitly determined otherwise . . . by the appropriate federal or local officials."
127. Cf. Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.
1971) (semble), upholding an administrative determination that section 4(f) is not
applicable because of a finding by a state deputy attorney general that the lands in
question were forest lands which had "not been set aside for park, wildlife interests
or recreation . . . ." Id. at 622-23. Compare Pennsylvania Environmental Council
with the Coast Guard's treatment of the Goleta Slough as qualifying de facto for
section 4(f) protection [note 64 supra and accompanying text], as to the need for
the lands to be "set aside" for the designated purposes. See also Arizona Wildlife
Fed'n v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1637 (D. Ariz. 1972), in which a forest highway project
was enjoined because of failure to comply with section 4(f). The road would have
run through lands which the court found as a fact to be "an area of national forest
land which is a unique and significant recreational area." The United States Forest
Service, which had jurisdiction over the lands, had stated that "[n]o proclaimed
recreation areas are invaded by the proposed project," [Id. at 1638] but had not
determined "whether this is or is not in fact a use of a recreation area of national,
state or local significance located on publicly owned land." Id. The court con-
cluded, "interpreted as a 4(f) finding of lack of significance, the statement of the
Forest Service reflects a clear abuse of discretion, an error of judgment, a failure
to follow the law." Id.
The Third Circuit further stated in Pennsylvania Environmental Council
that the Secretary is "not only entitled but even obliged, to accede to . . . [the local
official's] ruling ...." 454 F.2d at 623. This may overlook the Secretary's broader
authority under the "special effort" clause, which does not have the same "signifi-
cance" requirement. In the event, moreover, that the authority of the local official to
make a finding of non-significance is challenged, it has been held that defendants
have the burden of proving the authority so challenged, Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp.
262, 268 (W.D. Wash. 1972). Local findings of non-significance sometimes appear
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roads through parks are essential, no city council has yet dared to declare
that a park currently in important use is not significant.
Local authorities may be prepared, however, to certify that part
of a park is not significant, although the park as a whole is a significant
one.' Such a declaration may not be responsive to the requirements
of the section, which appears to prohibit the use of "any publicly owned
land" from parks, etc. of "significance." For the same reasons, how-
ever, that make it desirable to exclude non-significant lands from the
coverage of the last sentence of section 4(f), a method should be
available for treating non-significant areas within significant parks
differently from the standards set out in Overton Park. It should not
be necessary to prove that the costs of an alternative are extraordinary
in order to justify use of unimportant fragments. At the same time
great care is necessary to prevent creeping intrusions into significant
parks. It might be sensible, therefore, to require a full section 4(f)
in airport situations as well as in the case of highways. The Board of Commis-
sioners of Dade County, Florida, for instance, passed such a resolution with regard
to Thompson Park on July 25, 1972. Thompson Park is in an area proposed for
development of a jetport as an alternate to a controversial training airport which
has already been built near the Everglades National Park. Thompson Park is used
for campers' facilities, including trailer parking. It was opened late in 1966 at an
initial cost of over $218,000. The Commissioners resolved that "the Thompson Park
camp site facilities are not unique and can be replaced at another location . . . which
would be equal to or superior than the present location" and that "the present site
of the Thompson Park campsite facilities is not of local significance within Section
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act." Dade County Port Authority, South
Florida Regional Airport Site Selection Study Program: Preliminary Environ-
mental Impact Statement, at 131, 133 (Oct. 1972).
128. On February 24, 1970, for instance, the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania City
Council passed Resolution 20-1970, stating that "the portion of the area known as
Wildwood Park required for [highway purposes] has never been developed for park
or recreational purposes, and the City has no plans for the development thereof . . ."
It further stated that "the City of Harrisburg did not and does not consider the
particular area heretofore conveyed to the Pennsylvania Department of Highways
to be necessary or significant for future development for park or recreational pur-
poses." Secretary Volpe nevertheless "determined to treat the proposed highway
facilities as falling under the provisions of the section . . . ." Instead of suggesting
that the local determination of non-significance was invalid because it applied only
to part of the park, he relied in part on the fact that the Department of the Interior,
through its Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, had ". . . taken sufficient interest in Wild-
wood Park to suggest worthwhile changes in the design of the proposed highway
facilities." He also questioned "whether a tract's significance for future develop-
ment is identical to its 'significance' within the meaning of section 4(f)," and re-
ferred to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47
(1970), as an additional "mandate with respect to the preservation of scenic and
recreational resources." Statement and Determination of John A. Volpe Secretary
of Transportation, on River Relief Route and 1-81, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, May
18, 1970, discussed extensively, and found ambiguous, in Harrisburg Coalition Against
Ruin. Envir. v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918, 933 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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evaluation whenever any part, no matter how insignificant, of a sig-
nificant park is to be used, but to permit the Secretary a wider area
of discretion than that allowed in an Overton Park situation as to the
prudence of alternatives when the invaded area is not significant.
Historic sites present special problems. Unlike the other protected
lands they need not be publicly owned. When they are not publicly
owned, no presumption of a determination of significance can arise from
the fact of public maintenance since normally only publicly owned
property is publicly maintained. It is, on the other hand, customary
for historic sites to be designated as such by someone such as a local
or state landmarks commission, or by the United States Department of
the Interior. Any such designation is presumably equivalent to a
determination of significance for purposes of section 4(f).
The determination may be made by any of the local, state or federal
officials who can claim to have "jurisdiction thereof." For these pur-
poses "jurisdiction" may refer to more than merely political authority,
although governing bodies having general jurisdiction over the land
in question would be able to trigger the application of the last sentence
of section 4(f) by declaring their determination of the significance of
land which they wish to protect. An agency which is authorized to
decide that properties have historic importance may be regarded as
having "jurisdiction" over determinations of historic significance. Some
properties, for instance, are listed by the Secretary of the Interior in
the National Register of Historic Places.129 It is inconceivable that
a National Register property could be regarded as ineligible for pro-
tection under section 4(f), regardless of whether it was considered
"significant" by the local or state governing bodies having political
jurisdiction over the property. A similar triggering function may inhere
in a local or state historic society, if it has official status to designate
landmarks. It might also be found in a state parks or recreation
commissioner with respect to local parks which he has the authority
to classify for state purposes, although they may not be under his
administrative control.
D. The Limits of Judicial Review: Timing and Scope
1. Timing
Elsewhere in this article a question of timing is discussed as to
how early in the planning process section 4(f) should be applied."' 0
129. See note 77 supra.
130. See text section IIIA supra.
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A separate question arises in terms of how late in the planning process
is too late to obtain judicial review, particularly with regard to highway
projects which were well advanced before the effective date of section
4(f).131
The difficulties in this question have been exacerbated by four
complicating historical factors. First, highways are often planned
decades ahead of anticipated requirements. Litigation arising since
1967 concerning construction contracts let since the effective date of
section 4(f) typically involves undertakings based on key decisions
made prior to the enactment of section 4(f).'2 Second, the concept of
the Secretary's approval was not a term of art before section 4(f).
Third, the drafters of section 4(f), working through the Government
Operations Committees rather than the Public Works Committees of
the Congress, were not expertly familiar with the terminology or
processes of the federal-aid highway program,'33 and therefore did not
draft with explicit reference to the procedures of that program. And
fourth, additional "approval" procedures related to environmental
planning have become formalized since the enactment of section 4(f)
under requirements other than those of section 4(f), and similar
questions as to timing applicable to such additional procedures may
influence the answers to timing questions under section 4(f).
A further complication is bibliographic. The procedures of the
highway program have not been readily accessible to legal researchers
because the relevant documents have been deliberately withheld from
publication, apparently in order to minimize the opportunity for inter-
ference with highway programs by non-members of the highway con-
struction community.13 4 A statutory scheme is, of course, available in
Title 23,13' but the working jargon of the federal-aid highway program
reflects an intricate web of interactions between FHWA field personnel
and state highway departments barely suggested by the legislation. 3 '
131. Section 4(f) became effective on April 1, 1967, Exec. Order No. 11340, 32
Fed. Reg. 5453 (1967), 49 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
132. In the case of Overton Park, for instance, FHWA thought of the route
as having been "first approved August 2, 1947," and the "approval . . . reaffirmed
January 17, 1966." DOT Press Release FHWA-153 (April 19, 1968).
133. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
134. See Gray, Environmental Requirements of Highway and Historic Preserva-
tion Legislation, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 45, 62 n.66 (1970).
135. For a review of the statutory scheme see Arlington Coalition on Transp. v.
Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Fugate v. Arlington Coalition
on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
136. See, e.g., Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1971) ; LaRaza
Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221, 230 (N.D. Cal. 1971). FHWA procedures are
described in Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Program: Administra-
tive Procedures and Judicial Interpretation, 2 E.L.R. 50001 (1972).
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These processes are outlined in a series of orders and memoranda,
some called FHWA orders, some called Administrative Memoranda
("AMs"), some called Instructional Memoranda ("IMs") and some
referred to as Policy and Procedure Memoranda ("PPMs"), which
are usually not published in the Federal Register or the Code of
Federal Regulations but are instead circulated privately within the
highway program." 7 A bewildering sequence of federal "approvals"
is provided in these procedures, which may have given state planners
reason to consider FHWA at least morally committed to a number of
key decisions which were made before the enactment of section 4(f)
and which have since been reopened.
In a section 4(f) challenge, defendants in highway cases fre-
quently assert that the project was sufficiently advanced before the
effective date of section 4(f) so that section 4(f) does not apply; that
the project is so advanced as of the time of trial that changes are not
"feasible," "prudent," or "possible" within the meaning of those terms
as used in section 4(f); or alternatively, that the project was so
advanced before suit was brought that plaintiffs should be barred by
laches.
On the first question, that of whether the project is exempt from
section 4(f) because of the project's state of development before the
enactment of section 4(f), the courts have split. Since the operative
language of the second sentence of section 4(f) turns on the verb
'approve" (. .. the Secretary shall not approve any program or
project . . ."), it can be argued that.the applicability of section 4(f)
depends on whether the program or project had already been "approved"
before the effective date of section 4(f). If this approach is taken, the
further question arises as to which "approval" is determinative. In
the case of interstate highways, for instance, Title 23 calls for approval
of "the routes of . . . [the] system";13 "the . . . Interstate System"
or any "portions thereof" ;39 the fiscal year "program" of proposed
federal-aid highway projects of each state highway department ;140
"[s]uch surveys, plans, specifications, and estimates for each proposed
project . . . ." (the "P, S & E approval");141 the construction con-
137. Since April 1970, indices to these documents have been available from the
Office of the Records Officer, FHWA, Seventh and E Streets, S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20591, and copies have been available for inspection at facilities listed in Ap-
pendix D of Part 7 of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. See 23 C.F.R. § 1.32
(1972).
138. 23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(1) (1970).
139. Id. § 103(f).
140. Id. § 105.
141. Id. § 106(a).
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tract ;1412 and the construction itself.'43  Other approvals, required by
regulations' 44 to be interspersed among the statutory approvals, include
CCcorridor" and "design" approvals.' 45
The Third Circuit has stated that "[t]he date of design approval
is critical to the application of the statutes . . ." which were at issue in
Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Volpe, 4 ' one of which was section 4(f).
By "design approval" the court appeared to have meant the approval
of "essentially complete contract drawings,"'14 7 which the court held
antedated section 4(f).
On the other hand, it can be argued that "design approval" was
not a term of art at the time of the enactment of section 4(f), and
that this concept is more relevant to the requirements of PPM 20-8
concerning public hearings, which was also at issue in Wildlife Pre-
serves. '
48
The Fifth Circuit, ruling for the plaintiffs in Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway
Department, 49 similarly stated that the date of the "Secretary's ap-
142. Id. § 112.
143. Id. § 114.
144. PPM 20-8, 23 C.F.R. App. A (1972).
145. Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Volpe, 443 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1971).
146. Id. at 1274.
147. Id. at 1277. This would appear to be essentially the same as P,S&E ap-
proval. See note 141 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Indian Lookout Alli-
ance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S. D. Iowa 1972), where it is stated that "design
approval" was received on March 25, 1969 but plans, specifications, and estimates
had not been approved as of August 4, 1972. Id. at 1171.
148. "'Design approval' as a term in highway thinking is new, originating after
enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Department of
Transportation regulations adopted, if not in accordance therewith, in accommodation
thereof." Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Vt.
1972). NEPA became effective January 1, 1970. A somewhat earlier reference to
"requests for location or design approval" appears in PPM 20-8, 1110, 23 C.F.R.
App. A (1972) which is dated January 17, 1969, and refers for its authority, inter
alia, to 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970) and section 2(b) (2) of the DOT Act, 49 U.S.C. §
1651(b) (2) (1970). FHWA procedures prior to the issuance of PPM 20-8 are dis-
cussed in PPM 90-1 1" 5e(1), at 3.
149. 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
This ligitation grew out of the proposal by the Texas Highway Depart-
ment to build a highway through the Brackenridge - Olmos Basin Parklands in
San Antonio, note 23 sutpra. The San Antonio Conservation Society filed suit in late
1967. At first the action remained dormant for nearly three years, because there
was no final federal approval of the project until August 1970. During this time the
Department of Transportation unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement with the
Texas Highway Department, on design changes, originally, and then on an arrange-
ment for a study of alternatives to the park route. Finally it was agreed, without
notice to plaintiffs, that work could begin on the northern and southern end "seg-
ments" of the "project," outside the parks, but that alternative locations for the
center link would be studied. Plaintiffs moved for interlocutory relief; they were
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proval [of the project for federal funding] . . . [is] the operative date
for determining what law should apply in this case."15 Presumably this
was the date of PS & E approval under 23 U.S.C. § 106, although
the approval is not specifically identified in statutory or regulatory terms
in the opinion. This ruling, that the project was not exempt from
section 4(f) on grounds of prior "approval," was made in the context
that such approval by the Secretary did not come until 1970. The
San Antonio ruling is accordingly not necessarily inconsistent with
the position that the project may have been subject to section 4(f)
because of the non-occurrence, prior to the effective date of the section,
of other events as well.
The Fourth Circuit has supplied an alternative rationale. In
Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe 5' the court stated:
Date of approval ... is not the criterion for applicability, because
according to this criterion every project being built with federal
funds would be subject to... sections [4(f) and 23 U.S.C. § 138]
since the Secretary's "approval" extends through construction. We
agree . . . that Congress did not intend that all projects ongoing
at the effective date of the Acts be subject to these sections. At
delayed, however, in the district court until after contracts had been advertised for
bid and after the bids had been received and made public. The district court then
granted summary judgment for defendants permitting construction of the end seg-
ments. The Fifth Circuit heard plaintiffs' motion for stay two days before the bids
were to expire, and was told by defendants, incorrectly, that the delay had been
plaintiffs' fault. The circuit court denied plaintiffs' motion for a stay on November
18, 1970. Construction contracts were awarded within two days, and a week after
the decision, on November 25, the president of the San Antonio Conservation Society
announced that his organization had withdrawn from the litigation. The case had
been brought, however, in the name of the Society "and individual members thereof."
Some members, who disagreed with the decision to abandon the suit, decided to con-
tinue it on their own under the style "Named Individual Members of the San Antonio
Conservation Society. . . ." A petition for certiorari was denied over three dissents.
Named Ind. Mem. of San Antonio Con. Soc'y v. Texas Hy. Dep't, 400 U.S. 968
(1970). Ten weeks later the Supreme Court handed down an important decision
construing section 4(f), Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971), note 96 supra and accompanying text. In light of that decision plaintiffs re-
newed their motion to stay on grounds that conditions had changed and that Over-
ton Park compelled reversal of the previous San Antonio decision. The district
court denied the new motion but the Fifth Circuit reversed, partly in light of Over-
ton Park, and partly in reaction to proof that it had been misinformed by the de-
fendants at the first hearing. That misinformation concerned the reasons for the
delays as a result of which the court had been confronted with the imminent threat
that the construction contract bids would expire within two days after the hearing.
In fact defendants themselves had been responsible for those delays. 446 F.2d at
1018 n.11.
150. Id. at 1025.
151. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on
Transp., 400 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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some stage short of completion the costs already incurred in a
project could so outweigh the possible benefits of altering or aban-
doning the proposed route to avoid using parkland or to minimize
harm from the use that because of the stage of progress alone "no
feasible and prudent alternative to the use" would exist and "all
possible planning to minimize harm" would have been done. We
disagree. .., however, that because these sections are not applicable
to some ongoing projects they are not applicable to all ongoing
projects. Congress has declared through Sections 138 and 4(f)
that conservation of parkland is of the utmost primary importance
S.. [citing Overton Park]. Congress has also directed in Section
102 of the National Environmental Policy Act . .. that "to the
fullest extent possible ... public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies"
S.. [of that Act]. We are compelled, therefore, to conclude that
these sections are applicable to a project until it has reached that
stage of progress where the costs of altering or abandoning the
proposed route would certainly outweigh whatever benefits might
accrue therefrom, and that doubts about whether this stage has
been reached must be resolved in favor of applicability. 5 '
The Fourth Circuit attempted to harmonize those views with those
in San Antonio and Wildlife Preserves on grounds the implications of
which are not entirely clear. It pointed out that, in Arlington Coalition,
"parklands have not been acquired, P.S. & E. approval has not been
given, construction contracts have not been awarded, and construction
on the highway itself has not begun. '153 Since none of these steps
had been taken as of the time of the appellate decision in 1972, they
clearly had not been taken as of the effective date of section 4(f). The
prior "approval" on which the district court had relied in upholding
defendants was an authorization by federal authorities for the acquisi-
tion of the right-of-way through the parkland.'TM At the time of the
appellate opinion the parkland had not yet been conveyed to the
highway department, but instead was still used as a park. 55
On the facts of Arlington Coalition the Fourth Circuit could have
ruled with the Fifth Circuit that the date of PS & E approval was
determinative, 56 and still have upheld plaintiffs. Similarly, if "design
approval" in Wildlife Preserves was, on the facts of that case, essentially
152. Id. at 1335.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1334 n.3.
155. Id. at 1327, 1335.
156. See note 44 supra.
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the same as PS & E approval, the Fourth Circuit could have based its
decision on the Third Circuit's rationale. Instead the Fourth Circuit,
apparently,"' attempted to harmonize San Antonio with the observation
that in that case also neither PS & E approval, construction contracting,
nor actual construction had occurred as of the effective date of section
4(f). This suggests that the Fifth Circuit need not have rested on the
narrow ground of lack of "approval," but could have instead used the
Fourth Circuit's test, that the project had not "reached that stage of
progress where the costs of altering or abandoning . . . [it] would
certainly outweigh whatever benefits would accrue therefrom .... ""'
The Fourth Circuit had more difficulty in attempting to minimize
its difference with the Third Circuit. It distinguished Wildlife Pre-
serves on the ground that the "factor determining applicability in that
case . . . was the stage of completion of the highway; construction
contracts had been awarded and construction had begun."'"" In Wild-
life Preserves, however, construction had not been contracted or begun
before the enactment of section 4(f), but rather in 196960 before the
trial. It is entirely clear that the Third Circuit relied solely on "design
approval" alleged to have been completed before the effective date of
section 4(f), as the determinative date for the exemption of a project
from section 4(f).' 6 '
Assuming then a difference of opinion between the Fourth and
Third Circuits as to which stage must have been reached before the
effective date of section 4(f) in order to exempt a project, a number
of questions remain concerning the Fourth Circuit's views. The court
does not say whether it would be sufficient if the construction contract
had been let, but work had not begun, before the effective date. Pre-
sumably, however, it would still be possible the day after a contract
is signed that the value of improvements would outweigh their costs,
if such a possibility were clear the day before the same contract is
signed. In the absence of evidence as to the added costs resulting from
the mere existence of the contract, there is not an a priori basis for
considering such added costs decisive. It is similarly not clear whether
commencement of actual work should, under the Fourth Circuit for-
mula, foreclose the applicability of section 4(f), since, again, the "costs
already incurred in a project" might still not "certainly outweigh what-
ever benefits might accrue" from a change.
157. 458 F2d at 1335.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Wildlife Preserves, Inc. v. Volpe, 443 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (3d Cir. 1971).
161. Note 145 supra.
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In a somewhat analogous line of cases, relating to the applicability
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 6 2 to
projects ongoing at the time of its effective date, there has been a
marked tendency by the courts to opt in favor of applicability, on the
ground that Congress intended a maximum feasible effort to prevent
unnecessary environmental damage. 6 NEPA requirements for a de-
tailed environmental impact statement "in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . ...,164
could be distinguished from the second sentence of section 4(f) on the
ground that they do not purport to turn on a procedural event like a
Secretarial "approval." On the other hand the continuing spectrum
of approval requirements under Title 23, as noted by the Fourth
Circuit, 6 5 provides a basis for injecting section 4(f) into the planning
162. Among NEPA's procedural requirements, in addition to the detailed environ-
mental impact statement, is the provision that "to the fullest extent possible . . .all
agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary
approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and
the environmental design arts in planning and decision making which may have an
impact on man's environment. . . ." NEPA § 102(2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
The failure to use such a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach" may, in addition
to constituting a violation of NEPA, have a bearing on whether the Secretary has
complied with the "special effort" and "all possible planning" requirements of section
4(f). Section 102 of NEPA also provides that ..."to the fullest extent possible ...
the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this [Act] .... " 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
163. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 4 ERC 1933 (9th Cir. 1973);
Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1886 (2d Cir. 1972);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.
Wis. 1972); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa
1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971), case dismissed, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 4 ERC
1850, 1857 (6th Cir. 1972) the court stated:
[Ain agency must file an impact statement whenever the agency intends to
take steps that will result in a significant environmental impact, [whether or
not these steps were planned before . .. the effective date of the Act], and
whether or not the proposed steps represent simply the last phase of an inte-
grated operation most of which was completed before that date.
Some cases provide for the applicability of both NEPA and section 4(f) to ongoing
projects. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1330-37
(4th Cir. 1972). A more restrictive view on whether NEPA should be applied
"retroactively" is reflected in Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 454
F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971) and Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1972).
164. See NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970).
165. Note 152 supra.
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process after the commencement of construction, if it would be bene-
ficial to do so. The first sentence of section 4(f), which requires a
"special effort" to preserve parks and other protected lands, is not by its
terms keyed to approval actions and could well be read, in conjunction
with NEPA, to require that doubts as to the applicability of section
4(f) be resolved in the interests of environmental protection whenever
an alternate routing decision could still be "feasible and prudent,"
or whenever it is "possible" to "minimize harm" by a design change.
Similar considerations apply to the question of whether a section
4(f) review is foreclosed because of the stage of construction attained
before suit is filed, or trial held, assuming that the requirements of the
section should have applied to the project but in fact had not been met.
It is recognized that completed construction may render alternatives no
longer feasible or prudent, even if the same alternatives would have
been feasible and prudent before the construction, and even if the
construction itself is illegal because of non-compliance with section
4(f)."6 At the same time, however, if there has been an illegal com-
mencement of construction, a tendency is discernible to enjoin further
work in order to obtain a section 4(f) review, in the interest of pre-
serving protected lands which can still be saved. 6 '
If suit is not filed before the construction contract is let, or work
commenced, defendants frequently assert the defense of laches. On
166. The Arlington Coalition court noted, referring to NEPA, that:
[F]urther investment of time, effort, or money in the proposed route would make
alteration or abandonment of the route increasingly less wise and, therefore,
increasingly unlikely. If investment in the proposed route were to continue prior
to and during the Secretary's consideration of the environmental report, the
options open to the Secretary would diminish, and at some point his considera-
tion would become a meaningless formality.
458 F.2d at 1333. Addressing itself to the transportation legislation, the court further
stated, ". . . suspension of work on Arlington 1-66 [is] . . . necessary if the Secretary's
determination under Sections 138 and 4(f) is to be meaningful; continuing investment
in the project at its present state of development would render alternatives to use of
the parks less feasible and prudent." Id. at 1336. In Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 4
ERC 1684 (D. Hawaii 1972), where there was a stipulation by the parties that
construction on a proposed road should be suspended pending the processing of a
NEPA environmental impact statement, the court ordered that design work on the
disputed segment should also be suspended, because otherwise, "the [design] con-
tracts would involve the further expenditure of more than two million dollars [and]
completion of these contracts would increase the stake which the state and federal
agencies already have in the ... segment." Id. at 1685.
167. In San Antonio, for instance, after a long effort by plaintiffs which had
been generally unsuccessful, work was finally stayed on May 27, 1971, although
contracts had been let November 19 or 20, 1970, and "shortly thereafter construc-
tion . . . commenced." Named Ind. Mem. of San Antonio Con. Soc'y v. Texas Hy.
Dept., 446 F.2d 1013, 1019 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the whole the courts have been generous to plaintiffs in highway cases
on this issue. Dismissals for late filing have been denied with the
observation that laches is not merely a matter of the passage of time,
but depends on the diligence of plaintiffs, that is, whether the delay
was unconscionable, 18 or sometimes, as in the view of the Fourth
Circuit, because the courts "decline to invoke laches ... because of the
public interest status accorded ecology preservation by the Congress." 8
2. Scope of Review
The tension in section 4(f) litigation is between defendants' efforts
to persuade the judiciary to defer to administrative expertise on de-
cisions which are presented as questions of engineering, and plaintiffs'
efforts to maximize the scope of review.
In Overton Park170 the Supreme Court was faced with a decision
by the Secretary of Transportation to permit a road through a park
in the absence of formal findings by the Secretary on the issues covered
by section 4(f). The Court held that formal findings were not neces-
sary in this case, since they were required neither by statute nor by
the regulations in force at the time of the decision 1 71 (although a sub-
sequent DOT regulation now requires such findings) .172 The Court
paid lip service to the concept that "the Secretary's decision is entitled
to a presumption of regularity."' 7 It similarly rejected plaintiffs' con-
tentions that the agency decision be set aside under the Administrative
Procedure Act if it was not supported by "substantial evidence,' 1 74 or
that the Court provide a de novo review and set aside the agency action
as ". . . [u] nwarranted by the facts."'71 5 The Court nevertheless stated
168. See, e.g., Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 1 '. Supp. 1202, 1212 (D. Md. 1972); Nolop
v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (D.S.D. 1971); Harrisburg Coalition Against
Ruin. Envir. v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918, 924 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Elliott v. Volpe,
328 F. Supp. 831, 841 (D. Mass. 1971) (dictum); Pennsylvania Environmental
Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 246 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613
(3d Cir. 1971). For a situation in which plaintiffs were held to have delayed "in-
excusably" see Clark v. Volpe, 342 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 461 F.2d
1266 (5th Cir. 1972).
169. Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329, cert. denied,
Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transp., 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
170. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
171. Id. at 409.
172. DOT Order No. 5610.1 (Oct. 10, 1970).
173. 401 U.S. at 415.
174. Id. at 414.
175. Id.
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that the presumption of regularity accorded the Secretary's decision
"is not to shield his action from a thorough probing, in-depth review."'"7
Among the matters to be decided is "[w]hether the Secretary acted
within the scope of his authority," involving both "[a] delineation of
the scope of the Secretary's authority and discretion," and consideration
of "whether the Secretary properly construed his authority .... -177
This issue is particularly significant since it is fairly clear that neither
the Secretary nor any of his advisors construed section 4(f), before
the Overton Park decision, quite the way the Supreme Court interpreted
it. 7 8
The Court further stated that "the reviewing court must be able
to find that the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in this
case there are no feasible alternatives or that alternatives do involve
unique problems." It also required a determination that the actual
choice made was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law," which is to include "con-
sideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment." In addition inquiry may be made "whether the
Secretary's action followed the necessary procedural requirements."' 79
Having approved this potentially meaty scope of judicial review,
the Court renewed its deference to reticence: "Although this inquiry
into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard
of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency."' 80
The twin requirements for "a thorough, probing, in-depth review,"
and that "the ultimate standard of review . . . [be] a narrow one,"
can be reconciled if there is postulated a growing judicial skepticism
about the "presumption of regularity"'' in cases where there is room
for doubt as to whether an administrative determination has been based
solely on criteria which the agency has specialized competence to eval-
176. Id. at 415.
177. Id.
178. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
179. 401 U.S. at 417. For an example of a delay of a highway project because
a "probing, in-depth review" disclosed defects in the consideration of "relevant fac-
tors," and in "necessary procedural requirements" see Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp.
262, 263-67 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
180. 401 U.S. at 416. A conventional emphasis on the supposed narrowness of the
review function is reflected in Citizens to Preserve Foster Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 3
ERC 1031 (N.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1972).
181. For an example of traditional deference to the presumption see Pennsylvania
Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 619 (3d Cir. 1971), citing
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185 (1935), United States
v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) and Lewes Dairy, Inc. v. Freeman,
401 F.2d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 1968).
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uate. It has been observed in the context of other environmental
protection issues, particularly the preservation of wetlands, that the
administrative actions of mission-oriented agencies, charged with the
promotion of public works construction, are often determined not so
much by technical considerations of a type which courts are ill-equipped
to decide for themselves, as by unarticulated policy preferences. 8 2
The substitution of a court's judgment for that of an administrative
agency on such policy choices, particularly where the matter in ques-
tion relates to an interpretation of statutory standards, is not only
feasible, but often preferable. The detailed history of a section 4(f)
decision in the highway program frequently suggests, if unearthed
with a sufficiently "thorough, probing, in-depth review," that the key
administrative decisions were based on policy considerations other
than the requirements of section 4(f) as expounded in Overton Park,
and were made with scant regard to applicable procedural require-
ments.'8" Courts may well refrain from substituting their judgment
182. See, e.g., J. Sax, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 9-32 (1971). See also Get-
man & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1972).
183. An example of FHWA's disregard of DOT's procedural requirements is dis-
closed in the Overton Park Administrative Record, note 101 supra.
By way of background, it should be recalled that Secretary Volpe's personal
approval of the proposed highway design was necessary, for purposes of the "all pos-
sible planning" clause of section 4(f), since his responsibilities under the section had
not been delegated. See note 46 supra. The Secretary had, furthermore, as of April
25, 1969, required that all section 4(t) matters be coordinated with the office of his
Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and Environment "TUE" [later "TEU"], note
54 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, pursuant to FHWA's PPM 20-8, 23
C.F.R. App. A (1972), states have been required, since January 1969, to hold a "high-
way design public hearing" to consider the "social, economic, and environmental effects"
of a proposed design, as one of the conditions which must be met before "design ap-
proval." [The PPM also requires "corridor" public hearings before "location approval,"
and provides for certain exceptions to the hearing requirements, not relevant to the
question under discussion].
According to the Administrative Record, the design public hearing under PPM
20-8 was scheduled for May 19, 1969. On April 21, 1969, however, nearly a month before
the public hearing, the Regional Federal Highway Administrator in Atlanta was ad-
vised by E.H. Swick, Deputy Director of FHWA's Bureau of Public Roads, that "[tlhe
proposed plan and profile of 1-40 through Overton Park sent with your April 1 memo-
randum is satisfactory. We agree that the plan proposed by the State is the best overall
solution considering both park and transportation needs." Memorandum from E.H.
Swick, Deputy Director, Bureau of Public Roads, to Harry E. Stark, Regional Fed-
eral Highway Administrator, April 21, 1969.
On May 23, 1969 TUE in writing requested from FHWA a copy of the record
of the May 19 design hearing as soon as it should become available, and, in addition,
requested "that no decision be made on the design proposal without prior coordination
with TUE, in accordance with Secretary Volpe's instruction of April 25." No answer
having been received, this request was renewed by memoranda dated July 7, 1969.
On July 17, 1969, before any submission to the Secretary for his approval
under section 4(f), and without any prior coordination with TUE, FHWA Admnis-
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for that of the Secretary on "engineering" decisions that were really
engineering decisions. At the same time they may anticipate that, more
probably than not, section 4(f) administrative decisions in the highway
program, particularly before the Supreme Court's Overton Park
opinion, merit a presumption of irregularity in light of the Overton
Park criteria.
8 4
trator F.C. Turner replied as follows to James D. Braman, the Assistant Secretary for
Urban Systems and Environment:
[I]t is my conclusion that this project is too far advanced to permit reopening
it for further review of the mentioned points [the design of 1-40 through Overton
Park] ....
Accordingly, we had already advised the Regional Administrator that the
project should be advanced in a routine fashion before the receipt of . . . [the
July] memorandum. He will give careful attention to the detailed design as it
progresses. I cannot now agree to reopen the long and extended discussions that
have led us to the present point. I assure you that all of the requirements and ob-
jectives of the Section 4(f) language have been fully met in both the letter and the
spirit. We must now move ahead.
Administrative Record, Memorandum from F.C. Turner, FHWA Administrator, to
James D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and Environment, July 17,
1969 (emphasis added).
Mr. Turner was, of course, told by Mr. Braman that the authorization to the
Regional Administrator "is premature and should be rescinded until our respective
offices have complied with Secretary Volpe's instructions," and the proposed design
was subsequently submitted to the Secretary for his approval. Administrative Record,
Memorandum from James D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Environment and Urban
Systems, to F.C. Turner, FHWA Administrator, July 30, 1969.
FHWA's insensitivity to environmental procedural requirements, as evidenced
in this sequence, reflects a persistent resistance both to the participation of outsiders
in highway planning and to the notion that the agency's discretion in roadbuilding had
been significantly curtailed by section 4(f). This insensitivity, furthermore, and these
attitudes, pervade the entire administration of the Federal-aid highway program during
the period between the enactment of section 4(f) in 1966 and the Supreme Court's
Overton Park decision in 1971.
Such institutional misunderstandings on the part of FHWA can be understood
to be consistent to some extent with personal good faith on the part of the responsible
agency personnel. FHWA, like some other engineering agencies, was not administered
by lawyers, but by engineers who were reluctant to consult their lawyers except on
very narrow questions, such as the drafting and enforcing of contracts. Such engi-
neering administrators can be misled into relying excessively on their relationships with
congressional committee members and staff personnel, with whom they are accustomed
to working, for an understanding of the requirements imposed by the entire Congress.
That the 1968 Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House [see the text ac-
companying note 42 supra], for instance, was not an entirely reliable interpretation of
section 4(f) should not have surprised lawyers familiar with the legislative history of
section 4(f) ; it may, however, have been completely astonishing to FHWA and state
highway department engineers at the highest levels.
184. No judgment is ventured herein as to whether there has been sufficient im-
provement since 1971 to justify a presumption of regularity in respect of the more
recent administration of section 4(f), before any 1973 delegation of authority to the
operating administrations [note 55 supra]. As to post-delegation determination, obvi-
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court's Overton Park opinion, in March 1971, raised
fundamental questions about whether the administration of section 4(f)
had been based on a proper understanding of that provision's re-
quirements. In order to evaluate the administration of the section in
light of the Supreme Court's Overton Park criteria, an examination
was undertaken of the files of all section 4(f) cases in the records of
the Office of the Secretary of Transportation in the Spring of 1971,
shortly after the Supreme Court's action.1 1 5 This examination, which
covered the records of 123 section 4(f) cases, led to conclusions on
three different levels: first, the administration of this section; second,
general governmental organization for the achievement of amenity pro-
tection; and third, the organization of government for purposes of
optimum resource management.
A. The Administration of Section 4(f)
It appears likely that since its effective date section 4(f) has
been either ignored in scores of cases to which it applied, or has been
invalidly administered by subordinate officials to whom authority was
not delegated by the Secretary. The files referred to above were all
submitted to OST by DOT operating agencies during a period of
about 18 months beginning in the fall of 1969. Presumably a similar
incidence of impacts on protected lands occurred in the preceding like
period. Yet prior to the fall of 1969 only a half dozen or so cases
were referred to the Secretary for section 4(f) approval. The Overton
Park experience, indeed, provides a specific example of strenuous efforts
by FHWA to keep a section 4(f) decision from the Secretary. 8
Approvals were being requested at the time of contracting of the
specific project which was to be built in the protected land. Before the
enactment of section 4(f), the planning of the relevant routes was
typically determined by State highway departments, with the concur-
ously, the most skeptical scrutiny will be in order, particularly in regard to highway
projects, on the basis of FHWA's established record of support for illegal roads
through parks and historic sites.
185. This examination was undertaken in 1971 through the courtesy of the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Environment and Urban Systems; no one in that office,
of course, is responsible for any of my views.
186. See note 183 supra, concerning the question whether the design proposed by the
Tennessee State Highway Department constituted "all possible planning to minimize
harm . . . ." These efforts to bypass the Office of the Secretary of Transportation are
particularly revealing since they involved a defense by FHWA of the State highway
department's rejection of design proposals which had in effect been recommended earlier
by the Secretary of Transportation on the occasion of his section 4(f) approval of the
route, note 104 s'upra.
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rence of BPR field personnel. It is unrealistic to imagine that any
effort was made to protect parks when the routes were planned.
FHWA engineers frankly disclose in conversation that until recently
open space was deliberately chosen for urban highway routes, in order
to minimize costs and dislocation.
Because approvals were requested only at the time of project con-
tracting, routing options were usually limited by construction which
had been completed to a point very near the protected land. The routing
choices available to the Secretary may even have been narrowed by
other project approvals granted by FHWA without the Secretary's
approval since the enactment of section 4(f).
Submissions made to the Secretary rarely disclosed why alterna-
tives to a project would not be feasible or prudent, except in terms
condemned by the Supreme Court as insufficient in Overton Park,
namely that the alternative would involve some additional costs or
disruption or both. Sometimes the costs and disruption were quantified,
but before Overton Park they were almost never analyzed in light of
whether or not they were "extraordinary." The cost of the alternate
route is usually compared with the cost of a park route, not with the
cost of normal non-park urban construction.
The effects on protected land frequently appear trivial as described
by FHWA. The submissions generally emphasized the concurrence of
state and local officials in the choice of the route and there is seldom
any indication of controversy. The over-all effect of such a submission
could well be intimidating to a Secretary who might consider rejecting
a project which lacks Overton Park-type justifications. To disapprove
hundreds of highway projects throughout the country because of rela-
tively minor uses of protected lands would understandably appear im-
politic, since most of the projects are long-planned and apparently
acceptable to the communities concerned. Typically the files note local
impatience to complete needed roads, and the probable unpopularity of
non-park alternatives often seems patent even though the alternatives
would be difficult to reject in terms of the Overton Park criteria.
Unfortunately the same blandness permeates FHWA presentations
of projects known to involve serious park intrusions. It would be
difficult to perceive important section 4(f) difficulties from the FHWA
proposals for the use of protected lands. The issues were flagged instead
by the existence of controversy. Knowledge of such controversies may
enter the file through the initiative of the OST staff, or through repre-
sentations from other agencies, such as the Department of the Interior,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation. The problems are seldom pointed up
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as a matter of course in the routine documentation from FHWA re-
questing the Secretary's approval under section 4(f). This difficulty
is less evident in the case of section 4(f) presentations by FAA and
Coast Guard.
The impression is created that highway routing decisions which
were substantially conceived by BPR regional representatives before
the enactment of section 4(f) have not been seriously reconsidered by
the highway authorities in light of the section, and that the presenta-
tions to the Secretary are invariably justifications not to make a
change. This inference is reinforced by two additional problems which
tend to cast doubt on the validity of the approval process. First, it is
difficult to evaluate the significance of purported approvals by municipal
authorities because of possible pressure from state highway authorities
for approval of the state's location, failure to do so resulting in loss
of desired mileage ;1s7 and second, laxity in the observation of FHWA's
own environmental protection procedures suggests that such procedures
are sometimes considered as window dressing rather than as essential
substantive elements in the planning process. In only one or two cases
have location decisions actually been reversed by the Secretary on the
basis of section 4(f),' and in very few other cases have projects
been held up for re-studies ordered by the Secretary as a result of
the section.
Section 4(f) has been noticeably effective as a spur to moderate
expenditures to minimize harm to protected lands. These expenditures,
which often appear to be in the nature of compromises where opponents
would have preferred no parkland route at all, are occasionally suggested
by the Department of the Interior or the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, whose comments are requested by TEU in con-
nection with its staffing of the proposals for the Secretary. Except for
the reliance on the recommendations of these other agencies or of
opponents of the project, it is difficult to sense from the administrative
record whether these expenditures should be considered all possible
planning to minimize harm.189
187. A recent complaint, filed in Louisiana Environmental Soc'y v. Volpe in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, stated: "The City
of Shreveport had no voice in planning the route of the proposed 1-220 By-Pass
Project, which was planned entirely by the Louisiana Department of Highways and
submitted to the City of Shreveport on a 'take or leave it' basis."
188. Among the few cases of an actual route change, in addition to the Overton
Park project, note 98 supra, are the cancellation of the New Orleans Riverfront Ex-
pressway, note 83 supra, and the rejection of the Goleta Slough proposal, note 64 supra
and accompanying text.
189. The importance of the views of outside agencies has continued to characterize
DOT's section 4(f) paperwork. For instance, on March 20, 1972, Secretary Volpe ap-
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According to conversations with FHWA and OST personnel,
section 4(f) is beginning to influence new routing decisions away from
protected lands. At the state level, they suggest, it is becoming under-
stood that the problems of justifying an encroachment under section
proved a project involving the construction of Interstate 75 across lands near Lake
Allatoona, Georgia. This area is administered by the Corps of Engineers as part of a
flood control project and is ". . . generally managed by the Corps of Engineers to fulfill
a variety of active and passive recreation functions ... [and] wildlife management."
Reprint of Approval of United States Department of Transportation, Office of the
Secretary, Use of Public Recreational Lands for 1-75, at 1, March 20, 1972. The Secre-
tary stated that DOT considers the lands "as subject to the provisions of section 4(f)."
Id. He dismissed as not "feasible and prudent" a no-highway alternative and rejected as
"feasible" but not "prudent" alternate locations which would avoid the section 4(f)
lands entirely, because of added costs and displacements of families and businesses and
".. . unreasonable increase in travel distance for the Interstate traveler, particularly in
view of the minimal advantage to Section 4(f) lands." Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Among the alternate routes which traverse the section 4(f) lands, the Secretary selected
one which had the support of the National Recreation and Park Association, the Georgia
Parks and Recreation Society, the Georgia Recreation Commission, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of the Interior. The Secretary treated this evidence of support for the
chosen route, from among possible routes within the protected lands, as the basis for
determining that ". . . the corridor ... meets the requirement .. . for planning to
minimize harm . . . ." Id. at 9. This determination was made subject to certain condi-
tions for further planning to minimize harm. Some are reasonably specific, such as the
requirement that all stream crossings be designated in consultation with the State
Game and Fish Commission or the Corps of Engineers. Other conditions, such as that
"[a]lternative construction techniques and designs . . . be evaluated and a balancing
of cost and environmental benefits ... be utilized in establishing the vertical and hori-
zontal alignments and cuts and fills, with maximum attention to aesthetic considera-
tions," tend to perpetuate the problems discussed in the text of this article, but with
some improvement in tone. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
While the requirement for "maximum attention to aesthetic considerations" is
encouraging, it is doubtful whether a "balancing of cost and environmental benefits"
necessarily amounts to "all possible planning to minimize harm," particularly if the
"balancing" is to be done by FHWA. Highway agencies' benefit-cost analyses have
been debatable where recreational and wilderness values are at stake, even in connection
with the evaluation of purely economic considerations, without regard to the added
difficulty of quantifying aesthetic values. See, e.g., Neuzil, Uses and Abuses of Highway
Benefit-Cost Analysis - With Particular Reference to the Red Buffalo Route, SIERRA
CLUB BULL. 19-21 Jan. 1968. An added dimension of uncertainty with regard to the ap-
plication of the statutory standard is presented if the imputation of monetary values
to incremental improvements in aesthetics for purposes of the prescribed "balancing"
is left to FHWA's discretion. See Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972), which concludes:
The traditional model of cost-benefit analysis, with its single criterion of national
income, is ill-designed to achieve proper consideration of environmental factors. A
multiobjective approach, similar to that proposed by the Water Resources Council
for use in evaluating federal water projects, meets many of the objections to the
traditional model. However, to insure effectiveness and good faith in agency con-
sideration of environmental factors, it will be necessary for Congress and the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality to define classification systems, priorities, and guide-
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4(f) make it preferable to avoid urban open space whenever possible.
This is a recent development. It is too early to judge how widespread
it may be. It relates to projects which may be constructed five or
more years from now, and not noticeably to those which, having been
preliminarily planned in years past, are coming up for contracting over
the next few years.
B. Governmental Organization for Amenity Protection
Section 4 (f) has been effective to the extent that its administration
has involved the intervention of staff elements other than those re-
sponsible for the programs sought to be controlled by the section. For
example, a road-building agency wants to build roads. Its personnel
have been educated to believe that this activity is in the public interest.
The agency has traditionally been directed by Congress to work eco-
nomically, that is, to minimize expenditures, consistent with constraints
which it regards as relevant to transportation objectives. Its bureauc-
racy, moreover, looks to the Public Works Committees of Congress,
not to the Government Operations Committees, for approval and future
benefits. Such an organization can always persuade itself that an al-
ternative to the use of parkland is not "feasible and prudent," par-
ticularly "prudent," if such a decision is necessary to the perpetuation
of traditional roadbuilding plans and procedures. 190
Section 4(f) began to have some effect on highway planning only
when FHWA became convinced that the Secretary seriously intended
lines for federal agency officials to follow in making the important trade-off de-
cisions involved in planning federal projects which affect the environment.
Id. at 1116. For a searching critique of the cost-benefit analysis techniques of another
agency (the Corps of Engineers) see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 ERC 1033, 1082-95
(S.D. Tex. 1973).
There is a further objection to the Secretary's determination. Reliance on
future planning, rather than on planning which is already complete, has been held to vio-
late the requirement for all possible planning to minimize harm to such parks. In Mon-
roe County Preservation Council v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1886 (2d Cir. 1972) the court held:
The statutory mandate is not fulfilled by vague generalities or pious and self-
serving resolutions or by assuming that someone else will take care of it. The
affirmative duty to minimize the damage to parkland is a condition precedent to
approval for such a taking for highway purposes where federal funds are involved;
and the Secretary must withhold his approval unless and until he is satisfied that
there has been, in the words of the statute, 'all possible planning to minimize harm
to such park . . .,' and that full implementation of such planning to minimize is an
obligated condition of the project.
4 ERC at 1890.
190. For a detailed discussion of the dynamics of another program in terms of or-
ganizational and structural forces rather than assumed "rational" behavior [behavior
motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages] on the part of the responsible
bureaucracy see Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements,
85 HAiv. L. REv. 905 (1972).
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to review personally all decisions to which the section applies, and
that he would enforce coordination of such decisions with elements of
his staff in OST which were not directly involved in operational
programs.
If the administration of section 4(f) had been left to the operating
agencies, by delegation from the Secretary in the manner of the bulk
of FHWA's statutory authority, every highway routing controversy
which has led to the section's invocation would probably have been
decided as if section 4(f) had never been enacted, that is, essentially in
accordance with the state road commission's proposal for the use of the
protected land. The need for judicial vigilance in reviewing section
4(f) highway projects is accordingly intensified in light of Secretary
Brinegar's announced intention to delegate section 4(f) determinations
to the operating administrations." 1 Unless effective supervisory control
is retained in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, it seems
less likely, on the basis of present experience, that FHWA will view
park controversies as the courts believe Congress intended, than that
responsible outsiders will do so. It is, of course, possible that FHWA
may have developed enhanced insight and institutional capabilities for
environmental protection since 1971. On the record, however, it would
appear reasonable that the burden of persuasion rest on the agency
when it approves projects using protected lands.
The participation of agencies outside DOT, such as the Interior,
HUD and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, is also
helpful. That participation is made effective, however, largely because
the Secretary's staff in OST is in an independent position to emphasize
the views of those agencies to the Secretary when those views are
unwelcome to FHWA.
There is a need to identify environmental problems at an early
stage in the planning process. It is easier to influence public works
planning before fundamental decisions have been taken, than to alter
those decisions once they have been made. Developments such as
section 102(2) (C) of NEPA 92 are of the utmost importance in
helping to expose and make explicit environmental protection issues at
some stage in the planning process. In order to develop these issues
as early in the planning as possible, it is essential that state highway
departments comply with the provisions of section 5 of PPM 20-8,193
which call for an extensive solicitation of outside views well before
the hearing stage, when a state highway department begins considera-
tion of a traffic corridor development or improvement.
191. Note 55 supra as of May 1, 1973 no such delegation had been made.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970). See note 164 supra.
193. PPM 20-8 § 5, 23 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Part 1, App. A (1972).
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C. The Implications For Optimum Resource Management
The conflicts between transportation uses of protected lands and
environmental preservation objectives are special instances of a more
general problem - the difficulty of coordinating transportation pro-
grams with other public policy land use objectives. This difficulty
reflects, in part, the general absence of comprehensive land use planning
in the United States. While attempts have been made to encourage
planning, the results are typically fragmented. All too often transporta-
tion planning, primarily for highways, is financed independently of
other planning. Instead of accommodating itself to general land use
planning, the federal-aid highway program established its own pace
and direction, generating parameters within which other planning must
confine itself. Despite increasing criticisms... a persistent impediment
to reform is the continuation in its present form of the Highway Trust
Fund, under which about $5 billion is dedicated annually to the federal-
aid highway program." 5 Similar problems beset other federal public
works programs.
194. See, e.g., Comment, The Highway Trust Fund: Road to Anti-Pollution?, 20
CATHOLIC U.L. RaV. 171 (1970); Shannon, The Untrustworthy Highway Fund, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
195. 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1970) ; DOT Quarterly Reports on the Federal-Aid High-
way Program; note 17 supra. Pursuant to the Highway Revenue Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C.
§ 120 (note) (1970), there is appropriated to the Highway Trust Fund amounts
equivalent to certain specified percentages of the receipts from certain designated federal
excise taxes, such as the taxes on diesel fuel, 26 U.S.C. § 4041 (a) (1970) ; tread rubber,
26 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(4) (1970); gasoline, 26 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970) ; trucks and buses,
26 U.S.C. § 4061 (a) (1) (1970) ; and on lubricating oil, 26 U.S.C. § 4091 (1970). Total
increments to the Trust Fund were $4.69 billion in fiscal year 1969, $5.469 billion in
fiscal year 1970 and $5.725 billion in fiscal year 1971. Further receipts of $5.549 bil-
lion were estimated for 1972, $5,753 billion for 1973 and $6.106 billion for 1974. Excerpt
from 16th Annual Report of Highway Trust Fund, Hearings on 1972 Highway Legisla-
tion Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the House of Representatives Comm. on Public
Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 692-93 (1972). Funds so appropriated to the Highway
Trust Fund are available for expenditure only as provided in the appropriation acts.
However, because of the unusual authority in 23 U.S.C. §§ 104, 118 (1970), the
amounts accumulated in the Highway Trust Fund provide a self-generating source of
revenue, unavailable for other purposes, which Congress, on the recommendation of the
Public Works Committees, authorizes to be obligated as well as appropriated every
two years for the Federal-aid highway program [note 21 supra]. As a result, large
sums are almost automatically available for the highway program, whereas the fund-
ing of other activities which should be related, such as land use planning and alterna-
tive modes of transportation, is both uncertain and far smaller.
In 1972 the Administration proposed that part of the Highway Trust Fund
be available for an "Urban Transportation Program" comprising both highway sys-
tems and urban mass transportation facilities S. 3590, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 105 (a) (1),
601 (1972). An attempt to open the Highway Trust Fund for non-highway mass transit
expenditures along these lines, including planning, was passed by the Senate but re-
jected by the House, the House prevailing in conference committee. H.R. REP. No.
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Within the last two years suggestions have been made in both
Congress and the executive branch for the adoption of a national land
use policy.'9 6 It is unlikely that such a policy would eliminate all
conflicts toward which section 4(f) is directed. It might, however,
be a beginning toward a planning system in which highways and other
transportation facilities could be designed in a context of integrated
resource management programs, illuminated by the directives of section
4(f). In such a context it might become possible to reduce the
enormous burden of paperwork, the tensions of perpetual confrontation
between the highway program and conservationists, the serious de-
structive effects of transportation public works undertakings and the
probable proliferation of litigation which now characterize the imple-
mentation of section 4(f).
In the meantime section 4(f) can be an effective instrument for
reopening old planning in order to obtain reconsideration of decisions
made when prior attitudes prevailed as to the relative importance of
the resources which the section seeks to protect. The usefulness of
section 4(f) will depend in part on the skepticism which courts apply
92-1619, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972). The conference committee compromise would
have authorized $3 billion of "contract authority" for mass transit which, while it
would not have been charged against the Trust Fund, would have permitted the execu-
tive branch to incur obligations in advance of appropriations in a manner similar to
its highway financing operations under the Trust Fund. Id. at 46. The bill was not
passed by the House, however, because of a point of order which was raised at the
end of the session, [118 CONG. REc. H9294 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1972)] and accordingly
died with the adjournment of Congress. Apparently the bill failed because of Nixon
Administration objections to a provision which would have made funds available not
only for mass transit capital facilities, which the Administration supported, but also
for the subsidy of mass transit operating expenses, which the Administration opposed.
Letter to the Editor from Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1972, at 44, col. 3.
It is reported that the Administration will try again in 1973:
In a discussion with his chief environmental spokesmen, the President also pledged
a renewed effort to make money in the Highway Trust Fund available for mass
transit systems.
'The President told us it is one of his highest priorities for Congress,' said
Russell E. Train, chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. 'He said if
we didn't act on this legislation, Americans are going to spend the rest of their
lives on choked-up freeways.'
Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 8
196. See, e.g., S. 992, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 632, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE PRESIDENT'S 1972 ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROGRAM, 77-94 (1972); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY - THE THIRD ANNNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, 134-35 (1972); Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the
Courts, and the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1970). A proposed National Land
Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1972 passed the Senate late in the 92d
Congress, but not the House. 118 CONG. REc. S15,278 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1972). See
Farney, The Unsolved Problems of Land Use, Wall Street J., Feb. 2, 1973, at 8,
cols. 4-6.
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to the claims of highway-building agencies that their actions should be
accorded a presumption of administrative regularity, a presumption
which, in respect to the administration of section 4(f) before mid-1971,
the agencies in fact do not deserve. A similar reserve is in order in
respect of any administrative claims that courts should defer to an
assumed expertise on the part of the administrators.'97 As to the
197. A change is perceptible in judicial attitudes toward administrative claims.
It was conventional in the 1960's to emphasize that a judge should not "substitute his
judgment for that of highway officials in the selection of a route for a highway," and
that the "minimizing of hardships and adverse economic effects is a problem address-
ing itself to engineers, not judges." Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387
F.2d 179, 185 (6th Cir. 1968). It was, indeed, a generally accepted doctrine that a
highway department's decision "must be allowed to stand unless it was plainly wrong."
Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 663 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). While Overton Park repeats that "[t]he court is not empowered to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency," [401 U.S. at 416], in more and more cases
the courts assert the right to understand how the agency made its decision, in order
to be assured that the agency acted lawfully. In NEPA cases, for instance, it was
at first commonly said that the section 102(2)(C) [42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970)] re-
quirement for a detailed environmental impact statement is "procedural" rather than
"substantive." Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749,
755 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Now federal courts of appeal say that:
District Courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on
the merits to determine if they are in accord with NEPA. The review is . . .
for the purpose of determining whether the agency reached its decision after a
full, good faith consideration of environmental factors made under the stand-
ards set forth in §§ 101 and 102 of NEPA; and whether the actual balance of
costs and benefits struck by the agency according to these standards was arbi-
trary or clearly gave insufficient insight to environmental factors.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 4 ERC 1829, 1833 (8th Cir. 1972), quoted
with approval in Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 4 ERC 2039 (4th Cir.
1973). Similarly, in the context of the regulation of pesticides under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 74 U.S.C. §§ 135-35k (1970),
which involves highly complex technical judgments, we are told:
Our own responsibility as a court is as a partner in the overall administrative
process - acting with restraint, but providing supervision . . . . Environmental
law marks out a domain where knowledge is hard to obtain and appraise, even
in the administrative corridors; in the courtrooms, difficulties of understanding
are multiplied. But there is a will in the courts to study and understand what
the agency puts before us. And there is a will to respect the agency's choices
if it has taken a hard look at its hard problems.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 4 ERC 1523
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). In another FIFRA case, the same court had
earlier declared:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and fruitful
collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years,
courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference, con-
fining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of sub-
stance, the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction
of the "substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative
expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power to
set aside agency action on the ground that an impermissible factor had entered
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defense that projects with an extensive pre-1967 history should be
accorded immunity from such review, the Fourth Circuit has provided
a sweeping rationale in Arlington Coalition for judicial review except
where it can be determined in advance that the costs of change
"would certainly outweigh whatever benefits might accrue therefrom."'98
into the decision, or a cruicial factor had not been considered. Gradually, how-
ever, that power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement
that administrators articulate the factors on which they base their decisions.
Strict adherence to that requirement is especially important now that the
character of administrative litigation is changing. As a result of expanding
doctrines of standing and reviewability, and new statutory causes of action, courts
are increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches on funda-
mental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have al-
ways had a special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic
interest in a rate-making or licensing proceeding.
To protect these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it is necessary,
but not sufficient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action.
For judicial review alone can correct only the most egregious abuses. Judicial
review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will confine
and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require administrative
officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their discretionary
decisions in as much detail as possible.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 4 ERC 2041 (D.C. Cir.
1973). These opinions, in their willingness to analyze technical issues, albeit for
the ostensible purpose of determining whether an administrative agency has applied
proper criteria or exercised an appropriate methodology, suggest a kinship between
the judicial function in the review of administrative decisions and the courts' tradi-
tional role as fact finder where technical disputes are involved in the litigation of
common-law actions. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa.
1972). Here the court probed in extensive detail the methods, including statistical
analyses, used by the Division of Biologic Standards of the National Institutes of
Health in evaluating the neurovirulence of a batch of allegedly defective Sabin polio
vaccine. The court concluded that the decision of the Division to release the vaccine
to the public was inconsistent with the criteria of an applicable regulation, and that
the release was accordingly tortious, notwithstanding an elaborate defense by the
government which claimed both immunity from suit and that the decision to release
the vaccine was scientifically proper. The technical complexity of the issues did not
deter the court from coming to its own conclusions as to the relationship between
the test data and the requirements of the regulation: "It is true that this was a judgment
requiring professional expertise, but this does not render it discretionary. This Court
is fully capable of scrutinizing the processes and conclusions of the decision-maker by
the usual standards applied to cases of professional negligence." Id. at 33.
198. Note 152 supra and accompanying text.
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